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Guidelines for the Investigation of Contacts
of Persons with Infectious Tuberculosis
Recommendations from the National Tuberculosis
Controllers Association and CDC
Summary
In 1976, the American Thoracic Society (ATS) published brief guidelines for the investigation, diagnostic evaluation, and
medical treatment of TB contacts. Although investigation of contacts and treatment of infected contacts is an important compo-
nent of the U.S. strategy for TB elimination, second in priority to treatment of persons with TB disease, national guidelines have
not been updated since 1976.
This statement, the first issued jointly by the National Tuberculosis Controllers Association and CDC, was drafted by a working
group consisting of members from both organizations on the basis of a review of relevant epidemiologic and other scientific studies
and established practices in conducting contact investigations. This statement provides expanded guidelines concerning investiga-
tion of TB exposure and transmission and prevention of future cases of TB through contact investigations. In addition to the topics
discussed previously, these expanded guidelines also discuss multiple related topics (e.g., data management, confidentiality and
consent, and human resources). These guidelines are intended for use by public health officials but also are relevant to others who
contribute to TB control efforts. Although the recommendations pertain to the United States, they might be adaptable for use in
other countries that adhere to guidelines issued by the World Health Organization, the International Union against Tuberculosis
and Lung Disease, and national TB control programs.
Introduction
Background
In 1962, isoniazid (INH) was demonstrated to be effective
in preventing tuberculosis (TB) among household contacts of
persons with TB disease (1). Investigations of contacts and
treatment of contacts with latent TB infection (LTBI) became
a strategy in the control and elimination of TB (2,3). In 1976,
the American Thoracic Society (ATS) published brief guide-
lines for the investigation, diagnostic evaluation, and medical
treatment of TB contacts (4). Although investigation of con-
tacts and treatment of infected contacts is an important com-
ponent of the U.S. strategy for TB elimination, second in
priority to treatment of persons with TB disease, national
guidelines have not been updated since 1976.
This statement, the first issued jointly by the National Tuber-
culosis Controllers Association (NTCA) and CDC, was drafted
by a working group consisting of members from both organi-
zations on the basis of a review of relevant epidemiologic and
other scientific studies and established practices in conducting
contact investigations. A glossary of terms and abbreviations
used in this report is provided (Box 1 and Appendix A).
This statement provides expanded guidelines concerning
investigation of TB exposure and transmission and preven-
tion of future cases of TB through contact investigations. In
addition to the topics discussed previously, these expanded
guidelines also discuss multiple related topics (e.g., data man-
agement, confidentiality and consent, and human resources).
These guidelines are intended for use by public health offi-
cials but also are relevant to others who contribute to TB con-
trol efforts. Although the recommendations pertain to the
United States, they might be adaptable for use in other coun-
tries that adhere to guidelines issued by the World Health
Organization, the International Union Against Tuberculosis
and Lung Disease, and national TB control programs.
Contact investigations are complicated undertakings that
typically require hundreds of interdependent decisions, the
majority of which are made on the basis of incomplete data,
and dozens of time-consuming interventions. Making suc-
cessful decisions during a contact investigation requires use of
a complex, multifactor matrix rather than simple decision trees.
For each factor, the predictive value, the relative contribu-
tion, and the interactions with other factors have been
incompletely studied and understood. For example, the dif-
The material in this report originated in the National Center for HIV,
STD, and TB Prevention, Kevin Fenton, MD, PhD, Director, and the
Division of Tuberculosis Elimination, Kenneth G. Castro, MD, Director.
Corresponding preparer: Zachary Taylor, MD, National Center
for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention, CDC, 1600 Clifton Road, NE,
MS E-10, Atlanta, GA 30333. Telephone: 404-639-5337; Fax:
404-639-8958; E-mail: ztaylor@cdc.gov.
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ferences between brief, intense exposure to a contagious
patient and lengthy, low-intensity exposure are unknown.
Studies have confirmed the contribution of certain factors:
the extent of disease in the index patient, the duration that
the source and the contact are together and their proximity,
and local air circulation (5). Multiple observations have dem-
onstrated that the likelihood of TB disease after an exposure
is influenced by medical conditions that impair immune
competence, and these conditions constitute a critical factor
in assigning contact priorities (6).
Other factors that have as yet undetermined importance
include the infective burden of Mycobacterium tuberculosis,
previous exposure and infection, virulence of the particular
M. tuberculosis strain, and a contact’s intrinsic predisposition
for infection or disease. Further, precise measurements (e.g.,
duration of exposure) rarely are obtainable under ordinary
circumstances, and certain factors (e.g., proximity of exposure)
can only be approximated, at best.
No safe exposure time to airborne M. tuberculosis has been
established. If a single bacterium can initiate an infection lead-
ing to TB disease, then even the briefest exposure entails a
theoretic risk. However, public health officials must focus their
resources on finding exposed persons who are more likely to
be infected or to become ill with TB disease. These guidelines
establish a standard framework for assembling information
and using the findings to inform decisions for contact investi-
gations, but they do not diminish the value of experienced
judgment that is required. As a practical matter, these guide-
lines also take into consideration the scope of resources (pri-
marily personnel) that can be allocated for the work.
Methodology
A working group consisting of members from the NTCA
and CDC reviewed relevant epidemiologic and other scien-
tific studies and established practices in conducting contact
* Terms listed are defined in the glossary (Appendix A).
BOX 1. Terms* and abbreviations used in this report





Multidrug-resistant TB (MDR TB)
Mycobacterium bovis
Mycobacterium tuberculosis
Nucleic acid amplification (NAA)
Purified protein derivative (PPD) tuberculin
QuantiFERON®-TB test (QFT)
QuantiFERON®-TB Gold test (QFT-G)
Radiography
Secondary (TB) case
Secondary (or “second-generation”) transmission
Smear






Treatment for (or of ) latent (M. tuberculosis) infection
Tuberculin
Tuberculin skin test (TST)
Tuberculin skin test conversion
Tuberculosis (TB)
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investigations to develop this statement. These published stud-
ies provided a scientific basis for the recommendations.
Although a controlled trial has demonstrated the efficacy of
treating infected contacts with INH (1), the effectiveness of
contact investigations has not been established by a controlled
trial or study. Therefore, the recommendations (Appendix B)
have not been rated by quality or quantity of the evidence
and reflect expert opinion derived from common practices
that have not been tested critically.
These guidelines do not fit every circumstance, and addi-
tional considerations beyond those discussed in these guide-
lines must be taken into account for specific situations. For
example, unusually close exposure (e.g., prolonged exposure
in a small, poorly ventilated space or a congregate setting) or
exposure among particularly vulnerable populations at risk
for TB disease (e.g., children or immunocompromised per-
sons) could justify starting an investigation that would nor-
mally not be conducted. If contacts are likely to become
unavailable (e.g., because of departure), then the investiga-
tion should receive a higher priority. Finally, affected popula-
tions might experience exaggerated concern regarding TB in
their community and demand an investigation.
Structure of this Statement
The remainder of this statement is structured in 13 sec-
tions, as follows:
• Decisions to initiate a contact investigation. This sec-
tion focuses on deciding when a contact investigation
should be undertaken. Index patients with positive acid-
fast bacillus (AFB) sputum-smear results or pulmonary
cavities have the highest priority for investigation. The
use of nucleic acid amplification (NAA) tests is discussed
in this context.
• Investigating the index patient and sites of transmis-
sion. This section outlines methods for investigating the
index patient. Topics discussed include multiple inter-
views, definition of an infectious period, multiple visits
to places that the patient frequented, and the list of con-
tacts (i.e., persons who were exposed).
• Assigning priorities to contacts. This section presents
algorithms for assigning priorities to individual contacts
for evaluation and treatment. Priority ranking is determined
by the characteristics of individual contacts and the fea-
tures of the exposure. When exposure is related to house-
holds, congregate living settings, or cough-inducing
medical procedures, contacts are designated as high pri-
ority. Because knowledge is insufficient for providing
exact recommendations, cut-off points for duration of
exposure are not included; state and local program offi-
cials should determine cut-off points after considering
published results, local experience, and these guidelines.
• Diagnostic and public health evaluation of contacts.
This section discusses diagnostic evaluation, including
specific contact recommendations for children aged <5
years and immunocompromised persons, all of whom
should be evaluated with chest radiographs. The recom-
mended period between most recent exposure and final
tuberculin skin testing has been revised; it is 8–10 weeks,
not 10–15 weeks as recommended previously (4).
• Medical treatment for contacts with LTBI. This sec-
tion discusses medical treatment of contacts who have
LTBI (6,7). Effective contact investigations require
completion of therapy, which is the single greatest chal-
lenge for both patients and health-care providers. Atten-
tion should be focused on treating contacts who are
assigned high or medium priority.
• When to expand a contact investigation. This section
discusses when contacts initially classified as being a lower
priority should be reclassified as having a higher priority
and when a contact investigation should be expanded.
Data regarding high- and medium-priority contacts
inform this decision.
• Communicating through the media. This section out-
lines principles for reaching out to media sources. Media
coverage of contact investigations affords the health
department an opportunity to increase public knowledge
of TB control and the role of the health department.
• Data management and evaluation of contact investi-
gations. This section is the first of three to address health
department programmatic tasks. It discusses data man-
agement, with an emphasis on electronic data storage and
the use of data for assessing the effectiveness of contact
investigations.
• Confidentiality and consent in contact investigations.
This section introduces the interrelated responsibilities of
the health department in maintaining confidentiality and
obtaining patient consent.
• Staffing and training for contact investigations. This
section summarizes personnel requirements and training
for conducting contact investigations.
• Contact investigations in special circumstances. This
section offers suggestions for conducting contact investi-
gations in special settings and circumstances (e.g., schools,
hospitals, worksites, and congregate living quarters). It
also reviews distinctions between a contact investigation
and an outbreak investigation.
• Source-case investigations. This section addresses source-
case investigations, which should be undertaken only when
more urgent investigations (see Decisions to Initiate a
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Contact Investigation) are being completed successfully.
The effectiveness and outcomes of source-case investiga-
tions should be monitored critically because of their gen-
eral inefficiency.
• Other topics. This section reviews three specialized top-
ics: cultural competency, social network analysis, and
recently approved blood tests. Newly approved blood tests
for the diagnosis of M. tuberculosis infection have been
introduced. If these tests prove to be an improvement over
the tuberculin skin test (TST), the science of contact
investigations will advance quickly.
Decisions to Initiate
a Contact Investigation
Competing demands restrict the resources that can be allo-
cated to contact investigations. Therefore, public health offi-
cials must decide which contact investigations should be
assigned a higher priority and which contacts to evaluate first
(see Assigning Priorities to Contacts). A decision to investi-
gate an index patient depends on the presence of factors used
to predict the likelihood of transmission (Table 1). In addi-
tion, other information regarding the index patient can influ-
ence the investigative strategy.
Factors that Predict Likely
Transmission of TB
Anatomical Site of Disease
With limited exceptions, only patients with pulmonary or
laryngeal TB can transmit their infection (8,9). For contact
investigations, pleural disease is grouped with pulmonary dis-
ease because sputum cultures can yield M. tuberculosis even
when no lung abnormalities are apparent on a radiograph (10).
Rarely, extrapulmonary TB causes transmission during medi-
cal procedures that release aerosols (e.g., autopsy, embalming,
and irrigation of a draining abscess) (see Contact Investiga-
tions in Special Circumstances) (11–15)
Sputum Bacteriology
Relative infectiousness has been associated with positive
sputum culture results and is highest when the smear results
are also positive (16–19). The significance of results from res-
piratory specimens other than expectorated sputum (e.g., bron-
chial washings or bronchoalveolar lavage fluid) is
undetermined. Experts recommend that these specimens be
regarded as equivalent to sputum (20).
Radiographic Findings
Patients who have lung cavities observed on a chest radio-
graph typically are more infectious than patients with
noncavitary pulmonary disease (15,16,21). This is an indepen-
dent predictor after bacteriologic findings are taken into account.
The importance of small lung cavities that are detectable with
computerized tomography (CT) but not with plain radiogra-
phy is undetermined. Less commonly, instances of highly con-
tagious endobroncheal TB in severely immunocompromised
patients who temporarily had normal chest radiographs have
contributed to outbreaks. The frequency and relative impor-
tance of such instances is unknown, but in one group of hu-
man immunodeficiency virus (HIV)–infected TB patients, 3%
of those who had positive sputum smears had normal chest
radiographs at the time of diagnosis (22,23).
Behaviors That Increase Aerosolization
of Respiratory Secretions
Cough frequency and severity are not predictive of contagious-
ness (24). However, singing is associated with TB transmission
(25–27). Sociability of the index patient might contribute to con-
tagiousness because of the increased number of contacts and the
intensity of exposure.
Age
Transmission from children aged <10 years is unusual,
although it has been reported in association with the presence
of pulmonary forms of disease typically reported in adults
(28,29). Contact investigations concerning pediatric cases
should be undertaken only in such unusual circumstances (see
Source-Case Investigations).
HIV Status
TB patients who are HIV-infected with low CD4 T-cell
counts frequently have chest radiographic findings that are
not typical of pulmonary TB. In particular, they are more
likely than TB patients who are not HIV-infected to have
mediastinal adenopathy and less likely to have upper-lobe
infiltrates and cavities (30). Atypical radiographic findings
increase the potential for delayed diagnosis, which increases
transmission. However, HIV-infected patients who have pul-
TABLE 1. Characteristics of the index patient and behaviors
associated with increased risk for tuberculosis (TB) transmission
Characteristic                                            Behavior
Pulmonary, laryngeal, or pleural TB Frequent coughing
AFB* positive sputum smear Sneezing
Cavitation on chest radiograph Singing
Adolescent or adult patient Close social network
No or ineffective treatment of TB disease
* Acid-fast bacilli.
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monary or laryngeal TB are, on average, as contagious as TB
patients who are not HIV-infected (31,32).
Administration of Effective Treatment
That TB patients rapidly become less contagious after start-
ing effective chemotherapy has been corroborated by measur-
ing the number of viable M. tuberculosis organisms in sputa
and by observing infection rates in household contacts
(33–36). However, the exact rate of decrease cannot be pre-
dicted for individual patients, and an arbitrary determination
is required for each. Guinea pigs exposed to exhaust air from
a TB ward with patients receiving chemotherapy were much
more likely to be infected by drug-resistant organisms (8),
which suggests that drug resistance can delay effective bacte-
ricidal activity and prolong contagiousness.
Initiating a Contact Investigation
A contact investigation should be considered if the index
patient has confirmed or suspected pulmonary, laryngeal, or
pleural TB (Figure 1). An investigation is recommended if
the sputum smear has AFB on microscopy, unless the result
from an approved NAA test (Amplified Mycobacterium tuber-
culosis Direct Test [MTD], GenProbe,® San Diego, Califor-
nia, and Amplicor® Mycobacterium tuberculosis Test
[Amplicor], Roche® Diagnostic Systems Inc., Branchburg,
New Jersey) for M. tuberculosis is negative (37).
If AFB are not detected by microscopy of three sputum
smears, an investigation still is recommended if the chest
radiograph (i.e., the plain view or a simple tomograph) indi-
cates the presence of cavities in the lung. Parenchymal cavities
of limited size that can be detected only by computerized
imaging techniques (i.e., CT, computerized axial tomogra-
phy scan, or magnetic resonance imaging of the chest) are not
included in this recommendation.
When sputum samples have not been collected, either
because of an oversight or as a result of the patient’s inability
to expectorate, results from other types of respiratory speci-
mens (e.g., gastric aspirates or bronchoalveolar lavage) may
be interpreted in the same way as in the above recommenda-
tions. However, whenever feasible, sputum samples should be
collected (through sputum induction, if necessary) before ini-
tiating chemotherapy.
Contact investigations of persons with AFB smear or culture-
positive sputum and cavitary TB are assigned the highest pri-
ority. However, even if these conditions are not present, contact
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† Nucleic acid assay.
§ According to CDC guidelines.
¶ Chest radiograph.
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investigations should be considered if a chest radiograph is
consistent with pulmonary TB. Whether to initiate other
investigations depends on the availability of resources to be
allocated and achievement of objectives for higher priority
contact investigations. A positive result from an approved NAA
test supports a decision to initiate an investigation.
Because waiting for a sputum or respiratory culture result
delays initiation of contact investigations, delay should be
avoided if any contacts are especially vulnerable or susceptible
to TB disease (see Assigning Priorities to Contacts).
Investigations typically should not be initiated for contacts
of index patients who have suspected TB disease and minimal
findings in support of a diagnosis of pulmonary TB. Excep-
tions can be justified during outbreak investigations (see Con-
tact Investigations in Special Circumstances), especially when
vulnerable or susceptible contacts are identified or during a
source-case investigation (see Source-Case Investigations).
Investigating the Index Patient
and Sites of Transmission
Comprehensive information regarding an index patient is
the foundation of a contact investigation. This information
includes disease characteristics, onset time of illness, names of
contacts, exposure locations, and current medical factors (e.g.,
initiation of effective treatment and drug susceptibility results).
Health departments are responsible for conducting TB con-
tact investigations. Having written policies and procedures
for investigations improve the efficiency and uniformity of
investigations.
Establishing trust and consistent rapport between public
health workers and patients is critical to gain full information
and long-term cooperation during treatment. Good interview
skills can be taught and learned skills improved with practice.
Workers assigned these tasks should be trained in interview
methods and tutored on the job (see Staffing and Training for
Contact Investigations and Contact Investigations in Special
Situations).
The majority of TB patients in the United States were born
in other countries, and their fluency in English often is insuf-
ficient for productive interviews to be conducted in English.
Patients should be interviewed by persons who are fluent in
their primary language. If this is not possible, health depart-
ments should provide interpretation services.
Preinterview Phase
Background information regarding the patient and the cir-
cumstances of the illness should be gathered in preparation
for the first interview. One source is the current medical record
(38). Other sources are the physician who reported the case
and (if the patient is in a hospital) the infection control nurse.
The information in the medical record can be disclosed to
public health authorities under exemptions in the Privacy Rule
of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) of 1996 (http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pl104191.
htm) (39). The patient’s name should be matched to prior TB
registries and to the surveillance database to determine if the
patient has been previously listed.
Multiple factors are relevant to a contact investigation,
including the following:
• history of previous exposure to TB,
• history of previous TB disease and treatment,
• anatomical sites of TB disease,
• symptoms of the illness,
• date of onset,
• chest radiograph results,
• other results of diagnostic imaging studies,
• diagnostic specimens that were sent for histologic or bac-
teriologic analysis (with dates, specimen tracking num-
bers, and destinations),
• current bacteriologic results,
• anti-TB chemotherapy regimen (with dates, medications,
dosages, and treatment plan),
• results from HIV testing,
• the patient’s concurrent medical conditions (e.g., renal
failure implies that a renal dialysis center might be part of
the patient’s recent experience),
• other diagnoses (e.g., substance abuse, mental illness, or
dementia) that impinge directly on the interview, and
• identifying demographic information (e.g., residence,
employment, first language, given name and street names,
aliases, date of birth, telephone numbers, other electronic
links, and next-of-kin or emergency connections).
Determining the Infectious Period
Determining the infectious period focuses the investigation
on those contacts most likely to be at risk for infection and
sets the timeframe for testing contacts. Because the start of
the infectious period cannot be determined with precision by
available methods, a practical estimation is necessary. On the
basis of expert opinion, an assigned start that is 3 months
before a TB diagnosis is recommended (Table 2). In certain
circumstances, an even earlier start should be used. For
example, a patient (or the patient’s associates) might have been
aware of protracted illness (in extreme cases, >1 year). Infor-
mation from the patient interview and from other sources
should be assembled to assist in estimating the infectious
period. Helpful details are the approximate dates that TB
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symptoms were noticed, mycobacteriologic results, and
extent of disease (especially the presence of large lung cavities,
which imply prolonged illness and infectiousness) (40,41).
The infectious period is closed when the following criteria
are satisfied: 1) effective treatment (as demonstrated by
M. tuberculosis susceptibility results) for >2 weeks; 2) dimin-
ished symptoms; and 3) mycobacteriologic response (e.g.,
decrease in grade of sputum smear positivity detected on spu-
tum-smear microscopy). The exposure period for individual
contacts is determined by how much time they spent with the
index patient during the infectious period. Multidrug-
resistant TB (MDR TB) can extend infectiousness if the treat-
ment regimen is ineffective. Any index patient with signs of
extended infectiousness should be continually reassessed for
recent contacts.
More stringent criteria should be applied for setting the end
of the infectious period if particularly susceptible contacts are
involved. A patient returning to a congregate living setting or
to any setting in which susceptible persons might be
exposed should have at least three consecutive negative spu-
tum AFB smear results from sputum collected >8 hours apart
(with one specimen collected during the early morning)
before being considered noninfectious (42).
Interviewing the Patient
In addition to setting the direction for the contact investi-
gation, the first interview provides opportunities for the
patient to acquire information regarding TB and its control
and for the public health worker to learn how to provide treat-
ment and specific care for the patient. Because of the urgency
of finding other infectious persons associated with the index
patient, the first interview should be conducted <1 business
day of reporting for infectious persons and <3 business days
for others. The interview should be conducted in person (i.e.,
face to face) in the hospital, the TB clinic, the patient’s home,
or a convenient location that accommodates the patient’s right
to privacy.
A minimum of two interviews is recommended. At the first
interview, the index patient is unlikely to be oriented to the
contact investigation because of social stresses related to the
illness (e.g., fear of disability, death, or rejection by friends
and family). The second interview is conducted 1–2 weeks
later, when  the patient has had time to adjust to the disrup-
tions caused by the illness and has become accustomed to the
interviewer, which facilitates a two-way exchange. The num-
ber of additional interviews required depends on the amount
of information needed and the time required to develop con-
sistent rapport.
Interviewing skills are crucial because the patient might be
reluctant to share vital information stemming from concerns
regarding disease-associated stigma, embarrassment, or illegal
activities. Interviewing skills require training and periodic on-
the-job tutoring. Only trained personnel should interview
index patients.
In addition to standard procedures for interviewing TB
patients (43), the following general principles should be
considered:
• Establishing rapport. Respect should be demonstrated
by assuring privacy during the interview. Establishing
respect is critical so rapport can be built. The interviewer
should display official identification and explain the rea-
sons for the interview. The interviewer should also dis-
cuss confidentiality and privacy (see Confidentiality and
Consent in Contact Investigations) in frank terms that
help the patient decide how to share information. These
topics should be discussed several times during the inter-
view to stress their importance. Sufficient time should be
allocated, possibly >1 hour, for a two-way exchange of
information, although the patient’s endurance should be
considered.
TABLE 2. Guidelines for estimating the beginning of the period of infectiousness of persons with tuberculosis (TB), by index case
characteristic
                                  Characteristic
AFB* sputum Cavitary
TB symptoms smear positive chest radiograph              Recommended minimum beginning of likely period of infectiousness
Yes No No 3 months before symptom onset or first positive finding (e.g., abnormal chest
radiograph) consistent with TB disease, whichever is longer
Yes Yes Yes 3 months before symptom onset or first positive finding consistent with TB
disease, whichever is longer
No No No 4 weeks before date of suspected diagnosis
No Yes Yes 3 months before first positive finding consistent with TB
SOURCE: California Department of Health Services Tuberculosis Control Branch; California Tuberculosis Controllers Association. Contact investigation
guidelines. Berkeley, CA: California Department of Health Services; 1998.
* Acid-fast bacilli.
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• Information exchange. The interviewer should confirm
information from the preinterview phase, obtain missing
information, and resolve disparities. Obtaining informa-
tion regarding how to locate the patient throughout treat-
ment is crucial. The beginning of the infectious period
should be set from the information derived from this
exchange.
• Transmission settings. Information regarding transmis-
sion settings that the patient attended during the infec-
tious period is needed for listing the contacts and assigning
priorities (see Investigating the Index Patient and Sites of
Transmission). Topics to discuss include where the
patient spent nights, met with friends, worked, ate, vis-
ited, and sought health care. The interviewer should ask
specifically regarding congregate settings (e.g., high school,
university, correctional facility, homeless shelter, or nurs-
ing home). The interviewer also should inquire regarding
routine and nonroutine travel. Contacts not previously
identified might have been exposed during the patient’s
infectious period while the patient was traveling. Routine
travel modes (e.g., carpool) could also be settings in which
contacts were exposed.
• Sites of transmission. The key to efficient contact inves-
tigations is setting priorities. The investigator must con-
stantly balance available resources, especially staff time,
with expected yield. However, the interview with the
patient should be as comprehensive as possible. All pos-
sible sites of transmission should be listed, regardless of
how long the patient spent at the sites. Priorities should
be set on the basis of the time spent by the index patient,
and decisions regarding investigation of the sites and con-
tacts should be made after all the information has been
collected (see Assigning Priorities to Contacts and When
to Expand a Contact Investigation).
• List of contacts. For each transmission setting, the inter-
viewer should ask for the names of contacts and the
approximate types, frequencies, and durations of expo-
sure. Ideal information regarding each contact includes
full name, aliases or street names, a physical description,
location and communication information (e.g., addresses
and telephone numbers), and current general health. The
interviewer might need to spend more time asking
regarding contacts who are difficult for the patient to
remember. Recent illnesses among contacts should be dis-
cussed.
• Closure. The interviewer should express appreciation,
provide an overview of the processes in the contact inves-
tigation, and remind the patient regarding confidential-
ity and its limits. The patient especially should be told
how site visits are conducted and confidentiality protected.
An appointment for the next interview should be set
within the context of the schedule for medical care.
• Follow-up interviews. The best setting for the second
and subsequent interviews is the patient’s residence. If the
original interviewer senses incomplete rapport with the
index patient, a second interviewer can be assigned. The
follow-up interviews are extensions of the initial inter-
view. If the interviewer senses resistance to meeting in
certain places or discussing those places, making site vis-
its to those places might facilitate identification of addi-
tional contacts whom the index patient had not
remembered or wanted to name.
Proxy Interview
Proxy interviews can build on the information provided by
the index patient and are essential when the patient cannot be
interviewed. Key proxy informants are those likely to know
the patient’s practices, habits, and behaviors; informants are
needed from each sphere of the patient’s life (e.g., home, work,
and leisure). However, because proxy interviews jeopardize
patient confidentiality, TB control programs should establish
clear guidelines for these interviews that recognize the chal-
lenge of maintaining confidentiality.
Field Investigation
Site visits are complementary to interviewing. They add
contacts to the list and are the most reliable source of infor-
mation regarding transmission settings (17). Failure to visit
all potential sites of transmission has contributed to TB out-
breaks (25,44). Visiting the index patient’s residence is espe-
cially helpful for finding children who are contacts (17,38).
The visit should be made <3 days of the initial interview. Each
site visit creates opportunities to interview the index patient
again, interview and test contacts, collect diagnostic sputum
specimens, schedule clinic visits, and provide education. Some-
times environmental clues (e.g., toys suggesting the presence
of children) create new directions for an investigation. Cer-
tain sites (e.g., congregate settings) require special arrange-
ments to visit (see Contact Investigations in Special
Circumstances). Physical conditions at each setting contrib-
ute to the likelihood of transmission. Pertinent details include
room sizes, ventilation systems, and airflow patterns. These
factors should be considered in the context of how often and
how long the index patient was in each setting.
Follow-Up Steps
A continuing investigation is shaped by frequent reassessments
of ongoing results (e.g., secondary TB cases and the estimated
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infection rate for groups of contacts). Notification and follow-
up communications with public health officials in other juris-
dictions should be arranged for out-of-area contacts.
The following organizations provide resources to make
referrals for contacts and index patients who migrate across
the U.S.-Mexican border between the United States and
Mexico:
• Cure TB (http://www.curetb.com), a referral program
provided by the County of San Diego for TB patients and
their contacts who travel between the United States and
Mexico;
• Migrant Clinicians’ Network (TB Net) (http://www.
migrantclinician.org/network/tbnet), a multinational TB
patient tracking and referral project designed to work with
mobile, underserved populations; and
• Referral System for Binational TB Patients Pilot Project
(http://www.borderhealth.org/files/res_329.doc), a col-
laborative effort between CDC and the National Tuber-
culosis Program in Mexico to improve continuity of care
for TB patients migrating across the border (see Contact
Investigations in Special Circumstances).
Specific Investigation Plan
The investigation plan starts with information gathered in
the interviews and site visits; it includes a registry of the con-
tacts and their assigned priorities (see Assigning Priorities to
Contacts and Medical Treatment for Contacts with LTBI). A
written timeline (Table 3) sets expectations for monitoring
the progress of the investigation and informs public health
officials whether additional resources are needed for finding,
evaluating, and treating the high- and medium-priority con-
tacts. The plan is a pragmatic work in progress and should be
revised if additional information indicates a need (see When
to Expand a Contact Investigation); it is part of the perma-
nent record of the overall investigation for later review and
program evaluation. Data from the investigation should be
recorded on standardized forms (see Data Management and
Evaluation of Contact Investigations).
Assigning Priorities to Contacts
The ideal goal would be to distinguish all recently infected
contacts from those who are not infected and prevent TB dis-
ease by treating those with infection. In practice, existing tech-
nology and methods cannot achieve this goal. For example,
although a relatively brief exposure can lead to M. tuberculosis
infection and disease (45), certain contacts are not infected
even after long periods of intensive exposure. Not all contacts
with substantial exposure are identified during the contact
investigation. Finally, available tests for M. tuberculosis infec-
tion lack sensitivity and specificity and do not differentiate
between persons recently or remotely infected.
Increasing the intensity and duration of exposure usually in-
creases the likelihood of recent M. tuberculosis infection in con-
tacts. The skin test cannot discriminate between recent and old
infections, and including contacts who have had minimal
exposure increases the workload while it decreases the public
health value of finding positive skin test results. A positive
result in contacts with minimal exposure is more likely to be
the result of an old infection or nonspecific tuberculin sensitiv-
ity (46). Whenever the contact’s exposure to the index TB
patient has occurred <8–10 weeks necessary for detection of
positive skin tests, repeat testing 8–10 weeks after the most
recent exposure will help identify recent skin test conversions,
which are likely indicative of recent infection.
For optimal efficiency, priorities should be assigned to con-
tacts, and resources should be allocated to complete all inves-
tigative steps for high- and medium-priority contacts. Priorities
are based on the likelihood of infection and the potential haz-
ards to the individual contact if infected. The priority scheme
directs resources to selecting contacts who
TABLE 3. Time frames for initial follow-up of contacts of persons exposed to tuberculosis (TB)
Business days from Business days from initial
listing of a contact encounter to completion
Type of contact to initial encounter* of medical evaluation†
High-priority contact: index case AFB§ sputum smear positive or cavitary disease 7 5
on chest radiograph (see Figure 2)
High-priority contact: index case AFB sputum smear negative (see Figure 3) 7 10
Medium-priority contact: regardless of AFB sputum smear or culture result 14 10
(see Figures 2–4)
SOURCE: California Department of Health Services Tuberculosis Control Branch; California Tuberculosis Controllers Association. Contact investigation
guidelines. Berkeley, CA: California Department of Health Services; 1998.
* A face-to-face meeting that allows the public-health worker to assess the overall health of the contact, administer a tuberculin skin test, and schedule further
evaluation.
†The medical evaluation is complete when the contact’s status with respect to Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection or TB disease has been determined. A
normal exception to this schedule is the delay in waiting for final mycobacteriologic results, but this applies to relatively few contacts.
§Acid-fast bacilli.
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• have secondary cases of TB disease,
• have recent M. tuberculosis infection and so are most likely
to benefit from treatment, and
• are most likely to become ill with TB disease if they are
infected (i.e., susceptible contacts) or who could suffer
severe morbidity if they have TB disease (i.e., vulnerable
contacts).
Factors for Assigning Contact Priorities
Characteristics of the Index Patient
The decision to initiate a contact investigation is determined
on the basis of the characteristics of the index patient (see
Decisions to Initiate a Contact Investigation). Contacts of a
more infectious index patient (e.g., one with AFB sputum
smear positive TB) should be assigned a higher priority than
those of a less infectious one because contacts of the more
infectious patient are more likely to have recent infection or
TB disease (19,40,47–50).
Characteristics of Contacts
Intrinsic and acquired conditions of the contact affect the
likelihood of TB disease progression after infection, although
the predictive value of certain conditions (e.g., being under-
weight for height) is imprecise as the sole basis for assigning
priorities (51,52). The most important factors are age <5 years
and immune status. Other medical conditions also might
affect the probability of TB disease after infection.
Age. After infection, TB disease is more likely to occur in
younger children; the incubation or latency period is briefer;
and lethal, invasive forms of the disease are more common
(53–58). The age-specific incidence of disease for children
who have positive skin test results declines through age 4 years
(56). Children aged <5 years who are contacts are assigned
high priority for investigation.
A study of 82,269 tuberculin reactors aged 1–18 years who
were control subjects in a Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG) trial*
in Puerto Rico indicated that peak incidence of TB occurred
among children aged 1–4 years (56). Infants and postpubertal
adolescents are at increased risk for progression to TB disease if
infected, and children aged <4 years are at increased risk for
disseminated disease (57). The American Academy of Pediat-
rics also recommends primary prophylaxis for children aged <4
years (57). Guidelines published by ATS and CDC recommend
primary prophylaxis for children aged <5 years (6,59). These
guidelines are consistent with previous CDC recommendations
in setting the cut-off at age <5 years for assigning priority and
recommending primary prophylaxis (6,59).
Immune status. HIV infection results in the progression
of M. tuberculosis infection to TB disease more frequently and
more rapidly than any other known factor, with disease rates
estimated at 35–162 per 1,000 person-years of observation
and a greater likelihood of disseminated and extrapulmonary
disease (60–64). HIV-infected contacts are assigned high pri-
ority, and, starting at the time of the initial encounter, extra
vigilance for TB disease is recommended.
Contacts receiving >15 mg of prednisone or its equivalent
for >4 weeks also should be assigned high priority (6). Other
immunosuppressive agents, including multiple cancer chemo-
therapy agents, antirejection drugs for organ transplantation,
and tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNF-α) antagonists, increase
the likelihood of TB disease after infection; these contacts also
are assigned a high priority (65).
Other medical conditions. Being underweight for their
height has been reported as a weakly predictive factor pro-
moting progression to TB disease (66); however, assessing
weight is not a practical approach for assigning priorities. Other
medical conditions that can be considered in assigning priori-
ties include silicosis, diabetes mellitus, and status after gas-
trectomy or jejunoileal bypass surgery (67–76).
Exposure. Air volume, exhaust rate, and circulation pre-
dict the likelihood of transmission in an enclosed space. In
large indoor settings, because of diffusion and local circula-
tion patterns, the degree of proximity between contacts and
the index patient can influence the likelihood of transmis-
sion. Other subtle environmental factors (e.g., humidity and
light) are impractical to incorporate into decision making. The
terms “close” and “casual,” which are frequently used to
describe exposures and contacts, have not been defined uni-
formly and therefore are not useful for these guidelines.
The most practical system for grading exposure settings is
to categorize them by size (e.g., “1” being the size of a vehicle
or car, “2” the size of a bedroom, “3” the size of a house, and
“4” a size larger than a house [16]). This has the added advan-
tage of familiarity for the index patient and contacts, which
enables them to provide clearer information.
The volume of air shared between an infectious TB patient
and contacts dilutes the infectious particles, although this
relationship has not been validated entirely by epidemiologic
results (15,77–79). Local circulation and overall room venti-
lation also dilute infectious particles, but both factors can
redirect exposure into spaces that were not visited by the
index patient (80–83). These factors have to be considered.
The likelihood of infection depends on the intensity, fre-
quency, and duration of exposure (16,17,40,84). For example,
airline passengers who are seated for >8 hours in the same or
adjoining row as a person who is contagious are much more
likely to be infected than other passengers (85–88). One set
* The age-cohort effect was strong in this study, but this factor is beyond the
scope of these guidelines.
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of criteria for estimating risk after exposure to a person with
pulmonary TB without lung cavities includes a cut-off of 120
hours of exposure per month (84). However, for any specific
setting, index patient, and contacts, the optimal cut-off dura-
tion is undetermined. Administratively determined durations
derived from local experience are recommended, with frequent
reassessments on the basis of results.
Classification of Contacts
Priorities for contact investigation are determined on the
basis of the characteristics of the index patient, susceptibility
and vulnerability of contacts, and circumstances of the expo-
sures (Figures 2–4). Any contacts who are not classified as
high or medium priority are assigned a low priority. Because
priority assignments are practical approximations derived from
imperfect information, priority classifications should be
reconsidered throughout the investigation as findings are
analyzed (see When to Expand a Contact Investigation).
Diagnostic and Public Health
Evaluation of Contacts
On average, 10 contacts are listed for each person with a
case of infectious TB in the United States (50,59,89).
Approximately 20%–30% of all contacts have LTBI, and 1%
have TB disease (50). Of those contacts who ultimately will
have TB disease, approximately half acquire disease in the first
year after exposure (90,91). For this reason, contact
investigations constitute a crucial prevention strategy.
Identifying TB disease and LTBI efficiently during an
investigation requires identifying, locating, and evaluating
high- and medium-priority contacts who are most at risk.
Because they have legally mandated responsibilities for dis-
ease control, health departments should establish systems for
comprehensive TB contact investigations. In certain jurisdic-
tions, legal measures are in place to ensure that evaluation and
follow-up of contacts occur. The use of existing communi-
cable disease laws that protect the health of the community (if
applicable to contacts) should be considered for contacts who
decline examinations, with the least restrictive measures
applied first.
Initial Assessment of Contacts
During the initial contact encounter, which should be
accomplished within 3 working days of the contact having
been listed the investigation, the investigator gathers back-
ground health information and makes a face-to-face assess-
ment of the person’s health. Administering a skin test at this
time accelerates the diagnostic evaluation.
The health department record should include:
• previous M. tuberculosis infection or disease and related
treatment;
• contact’s verbal report and documentation of previous
TST results;
• current symptoms of TB illness (e.g., cough, chest pain,
hemoptysis, fever, chills, night sweats, appetite loss, weight
loss, malaise, or easy fatigability);
• medical conditions or risk factors making TB disease more
likely (e.g., HIV infection, intravenous drug use, diabe-
tes mellitus, silicosis, prolonged corticosteroid therapy,
other immunosuppressive therapy, head or neck cancer,
hematological and reticuloendothelial diseases, end-stage
renal disease, intestinal bypass or gastrectomy, chronic
malabsorption syndrome, or low body weight);
• mental health disorders (e.g., psychiatric illnesses and sub-
stance abuse disorders);
• type, duration, and intensity of TB exposure; and
• sociodemographic factors (e.g., age, race or ethnicity, resi-
dence, and country of birth) (see Data Management and
Evaluation of Contact Investigations).
Contacts who do not know their HIV-infection status should
be offered HIV counseling and testing. Each contact should
be interviewed regarding social, emotional, and practical mat-
ters that might hinder their participation (e.g., work or travel).
When initial information has been collected, priority
assignments should be reassessed for each contact, and a medi-
cal plan for diagnostic tests and possible treatment can be
formulated for high- and medium-priority contacts. Low-
priority contacts should not be included unless resources per-
mit and the program is meeting its performance goals.
In 2002, for the first time, the percentage of TB patients
who were born outside the United States was >50%; this pro-
portion continues to increase (92). Because immigrants are
likely to settle in communities in which persons of similar
origin reside, multiple contacts of foreign-born index patients
also are foreign born. Contacts who come from countries where
both BCG vaccination and TB are common are more likely
than other immigrants to have positive skin tests results when
they arrive in the United States. They also are more likely to
demonstrate the booster phenomenon on a postexposure test
(17,40). Although valuable in preventing severe forms of dis-
ease in young children in countries where TB is endemic, BCG
vaccination provides imperfect protection and causes tuber-
culin sensitivity in certain recipients for a variable period of
time (93,94). TSTs cannot distinguish reactions related to
remote infection or BCG vaccination from those caused by
recent infection with M. tuberculosis; boosting related to BCG
or remote infection compounds the interpretation of positive
results (95).
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A positive TST in a foreign-born or BCG-vaccinated per-
son should be interpreted as evidence of recent M. tuberculosis
infection in contacts of persons with infectious cases. These
contacts should be evaluated for TB disease and offered a course
of treatment for LTBI.
Voluntary HIV Counseling, Testing,
and Referral
Approximately 9% of TB patients in the United States have
HIV infection at the time of TB diagnosis, with 16% of TB
patients aged 25–44 years having HIV infection (96). In
addition, an estimated 275,000 persons in the United States
are unaware they have HIV infection (97). The majority of
FIGURE 2. Prioritization of contacts exposed to persons with acid-fast bacilli (AFB) sputum smear-positive or cavitary tuberculosis
(TB)  cases
* Human immunodeficiency virus or other medical risk factor.
† Bronchoscopy, sputum induction, or autopsy.
§ Exposure exceeds duration/environment limits per unit time established by the health department for high-priority contacts.
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TB contacts have not been tested for HIV infection (98). Con-
tacts of HIV-infected index TB patients are more likely to be
HIV infected than contacts of HIV-negative patients (99).
Voluntary HIV counseling, testing, and referral for con-
tacts are key steps in providing optimal care, especially in rela-
tion to TB (100,101). Systems for achieving convenient
HIV-related services require collaboration with health depart-
ment HIV-AIDS programs. This also can improve adherence
to national guidance for these activities (100).
Tuberculin Skin Testing
All contacts classified as having high or medium priority
who do not have a documented previous positive TST result
or previous TB disease should receive a skin test at the initial
encounter. If that is not possible, then the test should be
administered <7 working days of listing high-priority con-
tacts and <14 days of listing medium-priority contacts. For
interpreting the skin test reaction, an induration transverse
diameter of >5 mm is positive for any contact (1)
Serial tuberculin testing programs routinely administer a
two-step test at entry into the program. This detects boosting
of sensitivity and can avoid misclassifying future positive
results as new infections. The two-step procedure typically
should not be used for testing contacts; a contact whose sec-
ond test result is positive after an initial negative result should
be classified as recently infected.
Postexposure Tuberculin Skin Testing
Among persons who have been sensitized by
M. tuberculosis infection, the intradermal tuberculin from the
skin test can result in a delayed-type (cellular) hypersensitiv-
ity reaction. Depending on the source of recommendations,
the estimated interval between infection and detectable skin
test reactivity (referred to as the window period) is 2–12 weeks
(6,95). However, reinterpretation of data collected previously
indicates that 8 weeks is the outer limit of this window period
(46,102–106). Consequently, NTCA and CDC recommend
that the window period be decreased to 8–10 weeks after
FIGURE 3. Priority assignments for contacts exposed to persons with acid-fast bacilli (AFB) sputum smear-negative tuberculosis
(TB) cases
* Nucleic acid assay.
†Human immunodeficiency virus or other medical risk factor.
§Bronchoscopy, sputum induction, or autopsy.
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exposure ends. A negative test result obtained <8 weeks after
exposure is considered unreliable for excluding infection, and
a follow-up test at the end of the window period is therefore
recommended.
Low-priority contacts have had limited exposure to the
index patient and a low probability of recent infection; a posi-
tive result from a second skin test among these contacts would
more likely represent boosting of sensitivity. A single skin test,
probably at the end of the window period, is preferred for
these contacts. However, diagnostic evaluation of any contact
who has TB symptoms should be immediate, regardless of
skin test results.
Nonspecific or remote delayed-type hypersensitivity (DTH)
response to tuberculin (PPD in the skin test) occasionally
wanes or disappears over time. Subsequent TSTs can restore
responsiveness; this is called boosting or the booster phenom-
enon (95,107). For contacts who receive two skin tests, the
booster phenomenon can be misinterpreted as evidence of
recent infection. This misinterpretation is more likely
to occur for foreign-born contacts than it is for those
born in the United States (17,108).
Skin test conversion refers to a change from a nega-
tive to a positive result. To increase the relative cer-
tainty that the person has been infected with
M. tuberculosis in the interval between tests, the stan-
dard U.S. definition for conversion includes a maxi-
mum time (2 years) between skin tests and a minimum
increase (10 mm) in reaction size (6,34). With the 5
mm cut-off size used for interpreting any single skin
test result obtained in contact investigations, the stan-
dard definition for conversion typically is irrelevant.
For these guidelines, contacts who have a positive
result after a previous negative result are said to have
had a change in tuberculin status from negative to
positive.
Medical Evaluation
All contacts whose skin test reaction induration
diameter is >5 mm or who report any symptoms
consistent with TB disease should undergo further
examination and diagnostic testing for TB (6), start-
ing typically with a chest radiograph. Collection of
specimens for mycobacteriologic testing (e.g., sputa)
is decided on a case-by-case basis and is not recom-
mended for healthy contacts with normal chest
radiographs. All contacts who are assigned a high
priority because of special susceptibility or vulner-
ability to TB disease should undergo further exami-
nation and diagnostic testing regardless of whether
they have a positive skin test result or are ill.
Evaluation and Follow-Up of Specific
Groups of Contacts
Because children aged <5 years are more susceptible to TB
disease and more vulnerable to invasive, fatal forms of TB
disease, they are assigned a high priority as contacts and should
receive a full diagnostic medical evaluation, including a chest
radiograph (Figure 5). If an initial skin test induration diam-
eter is <5 mm and the interval since last exposure is <8 weeks,
treatment for presumptive M. tuberculosis infection (i.e., win-
dow prophylaxis) is recommended after TB disease has been
excluded by medical examination. After a second skin test
administered 8–10 weeks postexposure, the decision to treat
is reconsidered. If the second test result is negative, treatment
should be discontinued and the child, if healthy, should be
discharged from medical supervision. If the second result is
FIGURE 4. Prioritization of contacts exposed to persons with suspected
tuberculosis (TB) cases with abnormal chest radiographs not consistent
with TB disease
* Acid-fast bacilli.
† Nucleic acid assay.
§ Human immunodeficiency virus infection or other medical risk factor.
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positive, the full course of treatment for latent M. tuberculosis
infection should be completed.
Contacts with immunocompromising conditions (e.g., HIV
infection) should receive similar care (Figure 6). In addition,
even if a TST administered >8 weeks after the end of exposure
yields a negative result, a full course of treatment for latent
M. tuberculosis infection is recommended after a medical evalu-
ation to exclude TB disease (16). The decision to administer
complete treatment can be modified by other evidence con-
cerning the extent of transmission that
was estimated from the contact investi-
gation data.
The majority of other high- or medium
priority contacts who are immunocom-
petent adults or children aged >5 years
can be tested and evaluated as described
(Figure 7). Treatment is recommended for
contacts who receive a diagnosis of latent
M. tuberculosis infection.
Evaluation of low-priority contacts
who are being tested can be scheduled
with more flexibility (Figure 8). The
skin test may be delayed until after
the window period, thereby negating
the need for a second test. Treatment
is also recommended for these con-
tacts if they receive a diagnosis of
latent M. tuberculosis infection.
The risk for TB disease is undeter-
mined for contacts with documentation
of a previous positive TST result
(whether infection was treated) or TB
disease (Figure 9). Documentation is
recommended before making decisions
from a contact’s verbal report. Contacts
who report a history of infection or dis-
ease but who do not have documenta-
tion are recommended for the
standard algorithm (Figure 8). Contacts
who are immunocompromised or oth-
erwise susceptible are recommended for
diagnostic testing to exclude TB disease
and for a full course of treatment for
latent M. tuberculosis infection after TB
disease has been excluded, regardless of
their previous TB history and docu-
mentation. Healthy contacts who have
a documented previous positive skin
test result but have not been treated for
LTBI can be considered for treatment as part of the contact
investigation. Any contact who is to be treated for LTBI should
have a chest radiograph to exclude TB disease before start-
ing treatment.
Certain guidance regarding collecting historic information
from TB patients or contacts stipulates confirmation of previ-
ous TST results (e.g., a documented result from a TST) (4).
The decision regarding requiring documentation for a spe-
cific detail involves a subtle balance. Memory regarding medi-
FIGURE 5. Evaluation, treatment, and follow-up of tuberculosis (TB) contacts aged
<5 years
* Tuberculin skin test.
†Latent TB infection.
Evaluate with medical history, physical
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cal history might be weak or distorted, even among medically
trained persons. However, the accuracy of details reported by
a TB patient or contact might not be relevant for providing
medical care or collecting data. For previous TST results,
patients can be confused regarding details from their history;
routine skin tests sometimes are administered at the same time
as vaccinations, and foreign-born patients might confuse a
skin test with BCG vaccination or strep-
tomycin injections. For contacts (but
not patients with confirmed TB), a skin
test result is critical, and documenta-
tion of a previous positive result should
be obtained before omitting the skin
test from the diagnostic evaluation.
Treatment for
Contacts with LTBI
The direct benefits of contact inves-
tigations include 1) finding additional
TB disease cases (thus potentially
interrupting further transmission) and
2) finding and treating persons with
LTBI. One of the national health
objectives for 2010 (objective no. 14-
13) is to complete treatment in 85% of
contacts who have LTBI (107). How-
ever, reported rates of treatment initia-
tion and completion have fallen short
of national objectives (17,50,109,110).
To increase these rates, health depart-
ment TB control programs must invest
in systems for increasing the numbers
of infected contacts who are completely
treated. These include 1) focusing
resources on the contacts most in need
of treatment; 2) monitoring treatment,
including that of contacts who receive
care outside the health department; and
3) providing directly observed therapy
(DOT), incentives, and enablers.
Contacts identified as having a posi-
tive TST result are regarded as recently
infected with M. tuberculosis, which
puts them at heightened risk for TB
disease (6,7). Moreover, contacts with
greater durations or intensities of expo-
sure are more likely both to be infected
and to have TB disease if infected. A
focus first on high-priority and next on medium-priority con-
tacts is recommended in allocating resources for starting and
completing treatment of contacts.
Decisions to treat contacts who have documentation of a
previous positive skin test result or TB disease for presumed
LTBI must be individualized because their risk for TB disease
is unknown. Considerations for the decision include previous
FIGURE 6. Evaluation, treatment, and follow-up of immunocompromised contacts
* Tuberculin skin test.
† Tuberculosis.
§ Latent TB infection.
¶ Human immunodeficiency virus.
Evaluate with medical history, physical
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treatment for LTBI, medical conditions putting the contact
at risk for TB disease, and the duration and intensity of expo-
sure. Treatment of presumed LTBI is recommended for all
HIV-infected contacts in this situation (after TB disease has
been excluded), whether they received treatment previously.
Window-Period Prophylaxis
Treatment during the window period (see Diagnostic and
Public Health Evaluation of Contacts) has been recommended
for susceptible and vulnerable contacts to prevent rapidly
emerging TB disease (4,6,56,61,111). The evidence for this
practice is inferential, but all models and theories support it.
Groups of contacts who are likely to benefit from a full course
of treatment (beyond just window-period treatment) include
those with HIV infection, those taking immunosuppressive
therapy for organ transplantation, and persons taking TNF-α
antagonists (6,61,62,65). The risks for TB are less clear for
patients who chronically take the equivalent of >15 mg per
day of prednisone (6). TB disease having been ruled out, pro-
phylactic treatment of presumed M. tuberculosis infection is
recommended as an option for all these groups. The decision
as to whether to treat individual contacts who have negative
skin test results should take into consideration two factors:
• the frequency, duration, and intensity of exposure (even
brief exposure to a highly contagious TB patient in a con-
fined space probably warrants the same concern as
extended exposure to less contagious patients); and
• corroborative evidence of transmission from the index
patient (a substantial fraction of contacts having positive
skin test results implies contagiousness).
FIGURE 7. Evaluation, treatment, and follow-up of immunocompetent adults and children aged >5 years (high- and
medium-priority contacts)
* Tuberculin skin test.
† Tuberculosis.
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Treatment after Exposure
to Drug-Resistant TB
Guidelines for providing care to contacts of drug-resistant
TB patients and selecting treatment regimens have been
published (6,7,112). Drug susceptibility results for the
M. tuberculosis isolate from the index patient (i.e., the pre-
sumed source of infection) are necessary for selecting or modi-
fying the treatment regimen for the exposed contact. Resistance
only to INH among the first line agents leaves the option of 4
months of daily rifampin. Additional resistance to rifampin
constitutes MDR TB. None of the potential regimens for per-
sons likely infected with MDR TB has been tested fully for
efficacy, and these regimens are often poorly tolerated. For
these reasons, consultation with a physician with expertise in
this area is recommended for selecting or modifying a regi-
men and managing the care of contacts (6). Contacts who
have received a diagnosis of infection attributed to MDR TB
should be monitored for 2 years after exposure; guidelines for
monitoring these contacts have been published previously (6).
Adherence to Treatment
One of the national health objectives for 2010 is to achieve
a treatment completion rate of 85% for infected contacts who
start treatment (objective no. 14-13) (107). However, opera-
tional studies indicate that this objective is not being achieved
(17,110). Although DOT improves completion rates (17), it
is a resource-intensive intervention that might not be feasible
for all infected contacts. The following order of priorities is
recommended when selecting contacts for DOT (including
window-period prophylaxis):
• contacts aged <5 years,
• contacts who are HIV infected or otherwise substantially
immunocompromised,
• contacts with a change in their tuberculin status from
negative to positive, and
FIGURE 8. Evaluation, treatment, and follow-up of low-priority contacts
* Tuberculosis.
† Tuberculin skin test.
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• contacts who might not complete treatment because of
social or behavior impediments (e.g., alcohol addiction,
chronic mental illness, injection-drug use, unstable hous-
ing, or unemployment).
Checking monthly or more often for adherence and
adverse effects of treatment by home visits, pill counts, or clinic
appointments is recommended for contacts taking self-
supervised treatment. All contacts being treated for infection
should be evaluated in person by a health-care provider at
least monthly. Incentives (e.g., food coupons or toys for chil-
dren) and enablers (e.g., transportation vouchers to go to the
clinic or pharmacy) are recommended as aids to adherence.
Incentives provide simple rewards whereas enablers increase a
patient’s opportunities for adherence. Education regarding TB,
its treatment, and the signs of adverse drug effects should be
part of each patient encounter.
When to Expand
a Contact Investigation
A graduated approach to contact investigations (i.e., a con-
centric circles model) has been recommended previously
(4,5,113). With this model, if data indicate that contacts with
the greatest exposure have an infection rate greater than would
be expected in their community, contacts with progressively
less exposure are sought. The contact investigation would
expand until the rate of positive skin test results for the con-
tacts was indistinguishable from the prevalence of positive
results in the community (5). In addition to its simplicity and
intuitive appeal, an advantage to this approach is that con-
tacts with less exposure are not sought until evidence of trans-
mission exists. Disadvantages are that 1) surrogates for
estimating exposure (e.g., living in the same household) often
do not predict the chance of infection, 2) the susceptibility
and vulnerability of contacts are not accommodated by the
model, and 3) the estimated prevalence for tuberculin sensi-
tivity in a specific community generally is unknown. In addi-
tion, when the prevalence for a community is known but is
substantial (e.g., >10%), the end-point for the investigation
is obscured.
Recent operational studies indicate that health departments
are not meeting their objectives for high- and medium-
priority contacts (17,50,109). In these settings, contact inves-
tigations generally should not be expanded beyond high- and
medium-priority contacts. However, if data from an investi-
gation indicate more transmission than anticipated, more con-
tacts might need to be included.
FIGURE 9. Evaluation, treatment, and follow-up of contacts with a documented previously positive tuberculin skin test
* Tuberculosis.
†Latent TB infection.
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When determining whether to expand the contact investi-
gation, consideration of the following factors is recommended:
• achievement of program objectives with high- and
medium-priority contacts; and
• extent of recent transmission, as evidenced by
— unexpectedly high rate of infection or TB disease in
high-priority contacts (e.g., 10% or at least twice the
rate of a similar population without recent exposure,
whichever is greater),
— evidence of secondary transmission (i.e., from TB
patients who were infected after exposure to the source
patient),
— TB disease in any contacts who had been assigned a
low priority,
— infection of contacts aged <5 years, and
— contacts with change in skin test status from negative
to positive between their first and second TST.
In the absence of evidence of recent transmission, an inves-
tigation should not be expanded to lower priority contacts.
When program-evaluation objectives are not being achieved,
a contact investigation should be expanded only in exceptional
circumstances, generally those involving highly infectious per-
sons with high rates of infection among contacts or evidence
for secondary cases and secondary transmission. Expanded
investigations must be accompanied by efforts to ensure
completion of therapy.
The strategy for expanding an investigation should be
derived from the data obtained from the investigation previ-
ously (4,5,43). The threshold for including a specific contact
thereby is decreased. As in the initial investigation, results should
be reviewed at least weekly so the strategy can be reassessed.
At times, results from an investigation indicate a need for
expansion that available resources do not permit. In these situ-
ations, seeking consultation and assistance from the next higher
level in public health administration (e.g., the county health
department consults with the state health department) is rec-
ommended. Consultation offers an objective review of strategy
and results, additional expertise, and a potential opportunity to
obtain personnel or funds for meeting unmet needs.
Communicating
Through the Media
Routine contact investigations, which have perhaps a dozen
contacts, are not usually considered newsworthy. However,
certain contact investigations have potential for sensational
coverage and attract attention from the media. Typical
examples include situations involving numerous contacts
(especially children), occurring in public settings (e.g., schools,
hospitals, prisons), occurring in workplaces, associated with
TB fatalities, or associated with drug-resistant TB.
Reasons for Participating
in Media Coverage
Media coverage can provide both advantages and drawbacks
for the health department, and careful planning is recom-
mended before communicating with reporters. Favorable,
accurate coverage
• educates the public regarding the nature of TB,
• reminds the public of the continued presence of TB in
the community,
• provides a complementary method to alert exposed
contacts of the need for seeking a medical evaluation,
• relieves unfounded public fears regarding TB,
• illustrates the health department’s leadership in commu-
nicable disease control,
• ensures that constructive public inquiries are directed to
the health department, and
• validates the need for public resources to be directed to
disease control.
Potential drawbacks of media coverage are that such cover-
age can
• increase public anxiety, especially after alarmist or inac-
curate messages,
• lead unexposed persons seeking unnecessary health care
because of a perceived threat,
• contribute to unfavorable views of the health department
(e.g., because of perceived delays in responding to the TB
problem),
• contribute to spread of misinformation regarding the
nature of TB,
• trigger unconstructive public inquiries, and
• lead to disclosure of confidential information (e.g.,
patient identity).
Strategy for Media Coverage
Anticipatory preparation of clear media messages, coordi-
nated among all parties for clarity and consistency, is recom-
mended. The majority of health departments have formal
policies and systems for arranging media communications,
and TB control officials are advised to work with their media-
communications services in securing training and preparing
media messages anticipating news coverage. In certain
instances, this will require coordination among local, state,
and federal public health organizations. Issuing a press release
in advance of any other media coverage is recommended so as
to provide clear, accurate messages from the start. Waiting
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until a story reaches the media through other sources leaves
the health department reacting to inaccuracies in the story
and could lend credence to a perception that information is
being withheld from the public.
Certain newsworthy contact investigations involve collabo-
rators outside of the health department because of the setting
(e.g., a homeless shelter). The administrators of these settings
are likely to have concerns, distinct from the public health
agenda, regarding media coverage. For example, a hospital
administrator might worry that reports of suspected TB
exposures in the hospital will create public distrust of the hos-
pital. Collaboration on media messages is a difficult but nec-
essary part of the overall partnership between the hospital (in
this example) and the health department. Early discussions
regarding media coverage are recommended for reducing later
misunderstandings. In addition, development of a list of com-
munication objectives also is recommended in preparing for
media inquiries.
Data Management and Evaluation
of Contact Investigations
Data collection related to contact investigations has three
broad purposes: 1) management of care and follow-up for
individual index patients and contacts, 2) epidemiologic analy-
sis of an investigation in progress and investigations overall,
and 3) program evaluation using performance indicators that
reflect performance objectives. A systematic, consistent
approach to data collection, organization, analysis, and dis-
semination is required (114–117).
Data collection and storage entail both substantial work and
an investment in systems to obtain full benefits from the efforts.
Selecting data for inclusion requires balancing the extra work
of collecting data against the lost information if data are not
collected. If data are collected but not studied and used when
decisions are made, then data collection is a wasted effort.
The most efficient strategy for determining which data to col-
lect is to work back from the intended uses of the data.
Reasons Contact Investigation Data
Are Needed
For each index patient and the patient’s associated contacts,
a broad amount of demographic, epidemiologic, historic, and
medical information is needed for providing comprehensive
care (Tables 2, 4, and 5). In certain instances, such care can
last >1 year, so information builds by steps and has numerous
longitudinal elements (e.g., number of clinic visits attended,
number of treatment doses administered, or mycobacteriologic
response to treatment). Data on certain process steps are nec-
essary for monitoring whether the contact investigation is keep-
ing to timeline objectives (e.g., how soon after listing the skin
test is administered to a contact).
Aggregated data collected during an investigation inform
public health officials whether the investigation is on time
and complete. The ongoing analysis of data also contributes
to reassessment of the strategy used in the investigation (e.g.,
whether the infection rate was greater for contacts believed to
have more exposure).
Data from a completed investigation and from all investi-
gations in a fixed period (e.g., 6 months) might demonstrate
progress in meeting program objectives (Box 2). However,
these core measurements for program evaluation cannot
directly demonstrate why particular objectives were not
TABLE 4. Minimal recommended data concerning the index
patient
Identifiers and demographic information
Case manager
Name and aliases
For minors and dependents, guardian information
Date of birth*
Social security number
Current locating information and emergency contacts
Residences during infectious period if unstably housed





If foreign born, length of time in United States*
Primary language and preferred language
Methods of translation or interpretation
Settings in which index patient might have transmitted tuberculosis
(TB) and associated timeframes
Living situation(s)
Employment or school
Social and recreational activities
Congregate settings (e.g. jail or homeless shelter)*
Substance abuse with social implications (e.g., crack cocaine)*
TB information
Health-care provider for TB (e.g., public health, private, both, other)*
Anatomic site of disease*
Symptoms and their dates
Chest radiograph results, including presence of cavity*
TB medications with start and stop dates*
Bacteriologic results (sputum smear, culture, and drug susceptibility)
with dates*
Previous history of TB disease and treatment*
Previous history of exposure to other persons diagnosed with TB




Date of initial interview with index patient
Dates of follow-up interviews with the index patient
* Data items collected on the Report of a Verified Case of Tuberculosis
(RVCT) form.
†HIV/AIDS Reporting System.
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achieved. If the data are structured and stored in formats that
permit detailed retrospective review, then the reasons for prob-
lems can be studied. CDC’s Framework for Program Evalua-
tion in Public Health is recommended for assessing the overall
activities of contact investigations (118).
Data definitions are crucial for consistency and subsequent
mutual comprehension of analytic results. However, detailed
definitions that accommodate every contingency defeat the
simplicity required for an efficient system. Data definitions
are best when they satisfy the most important contingencies.
This requires a trade-off between completeness and clarity. As
with the initial selection of data, working back from the
intended uses of the data is helpful in deciding how much
detail the data definitions should have.
Routine data collection can indicate whether the priority
assignments of contacts were a good match to the final results
(e.g., infection rates and achievement of timelines). These data
cannot determine whether all contacts with substantial expo-
sure were included in the original list (i.e., whether certain
contacts who should have been ranked as high priority were
missed completely because of gaps in the investigation).
Methods for Data Collection
and Storage
Direct computer entry of all contact investigation data is rec-
ommended. Systems designed to increase data quality (e.g.,
through use of error checking rules) are preferred. However,
technologic and resource limitations are likely to require at least
partial use of paper forms and subsequent transfer at a com-
puter console, which requires a greater level of data quality
assurance because of potential errors in the transfer. Security
precautions for both paper copy and electronically generated
data should be commensurate with the confidentiality of the
information. Ongoing training concerning systems is recom-
mended for personnel who collect or use the data.
A comprehensive U.S. software system for contact investiga-
tion data collection and storage has not been implemented.
Health department officials are advised to borrow working sys-
tems from other jurisdictions that have similar TB control pro-
grams. Any system should incorporate these recommendations.
TABLE 5. Minimal data recommended concerning each contact
of persons with tuberculosis (TB)
Investigator and dates
Contact manager or investigator
Date listed
How or why contact was listed (e.g., named by index patient)
Dates of interviews
Start and end dates for exposure (updated as new information arrives)
Identifiers
Name and aliases
For minors and dependents, guardian information
Social security number
Date of birth





If foreign born, length of time in the United States
Primary language and preferred language
Methods of translation or interpretation
Relationship or connection to index patient
Social affiliations (e.g., work, school, church, clubs, or activities)
Environmental information about exposure settings (e.g., size
or ventilation)
Frequency, duration, and time frame of interactions
Previous history of TB disease or latent infection, and
documentation
BCG† vaccination and date
Medical risk factors for progression of infection to TB disease*
Population risk factors for prevalent Mycobacterium tuberculosis
infection*
Evaluation for TB disease and latent infection
Health-care provider for TB (e.g., public health, private, both, or other)
Symptoms suggesting TB disease
Tuberculin skin tests, with dates, reagents, and lot numbers,
and reaction measurement
Chest radiograph results with dates
Bacteriologic results with dates
HIV infection status
Final diagnostic classifications for latent M. tuberculosis infection
or disease
Treatment information for contacts with latent M. tuberculosis
infection
Dates of treatment
Treatment regimen (medication, dosing schedule, and any changes
to these)
Methods of supervising treatment (e.g., directly observed treatment.)
Adverse effects (specify each)
Interruptions in regimen and dates
Outcome of treatment (e.g., completion, consistent with ARPE*)
If treatment not completed, reason*
* Aggregate report for program evaluation.
† Bacille Calmette-Guérin.
BOX 2. Recommended objectives for contact investigations,
by key indicators
Key indicator     Objective
Infectious index patients with at least 90%
one contact listed
Contacts who are evaluated for 90%
tuberculosis disease and latent
infection
Infected contacts who begin treatment 85%
for latent infection
Treated contacts who complete
treatment for latent infection 75%
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Computer storage of data offers improved performance of
daily activities because a comprehensive system can provide
reminders regarding the care needs of individual contacts (e.g.,
notification regarding contacts who need second skin tests and
recommended dates). A system also can perform interim analy-
sis of aggregate results at prescheduled intervals. This contrib-
utes both to reassessment of the investigative strategy (see




Multiple laws and regulations protect the privacy and con-
fidentiality of patients’ health care information (119). Appli-
cable federal laws include Sections 306 and 308(d) of the Public
Health Service Act; the Freedom of Information Act of 1966;
the Privacy Act of 1974, which restricts the use of Social
Security numbers; the Privacy Protection Act of 1998; and
the Privacy Rule of HIPAA, which protects individually iden-
tifiable health information and requires an authorization of
disclosure (39). Section 164.512 of HIPAA lists exemptions
to the need to obtain authorization, which include communi-
cable diseases reported by a public health authority as autho-
rized by law (120). Interrelationships between Federal and State
codes are complex, and consultation with health department
legal counsel is recommended when preparing policies gov-
erning contact investigations.
Maintaining confidentiality is challenging during contact
investigations because of the social connections between an
index patient and contacts. Constant attention is required to main-
tain confidentiality. Ongoing discussions with the index patient
and contacts regarding confidentiality are helpful in finding
solutions, and individual preferences often can be accommodated.
Legal and ethical issues in sharing confidential information some-
times can be resolved by obtaining consent from the patient to
disclose information to specified persons and by documenting
this consent with a signed form.
The index patient might not know the names of contacts,
and contacts might not know the index patient by name. With
the patient’s consent, a photograph of the patient or of con-
tacts might be a legal option to assist in identifying contacts.
In certain places, separate consent forms are required for tak-
ing the photograph and for sharing it with other persons. In
congregate settings, access to occupancy rosters might be nec-
essary to identify exposed contacts in need of evaluation.
In their approach to confidentiality and consent issues for
contact investigations, TB control programs will need to
address the following:
• Policies and training. Policies explicitly regarding TB
contact investigations are recommended for inclusion in
the health department’s overall policies for protecting con-
fidentiality and breaking it when needed. Consultation
with legal counsel improves the utility and validity of the
policies. Periodic training in the policies is recommended
for all staff who participate in contact investigations,
including receptionists, interpreters, and clerical personnel.
• Informed consent. Consent for disclosure of informa-
tion in the patient’s primary language is recommended.
Refusal to grant consent can threaten public health and
requires documentation and sometimes legal consultation
for determining acceptable interventions. Any deliberate
breach of confidentiality by the health department should
be authorized by law and documented. Accidental
breaches should be brought to the attention of the legal
counsel for advice on remediation. Obtaining informed
consent presents the opportunity for learning patient pref-
erence for confidentiality. Frequent discussions between
health department workers and patients regarding confi-
dentiality can allay mistrust.
• Site investigations. Especially in congregate settings (e.g.,
the workplace), maintaining confidentiality during a TB
contact investigation is threatened by site visits. Antici-
patory discussions with the patient can lead to solutions
for safeguarding confidentiality, and a patient’s preferences
should be honored when consistent with laws and good
practices (121). In addition, to the extent that onsite
administrators already know confidential information
regarding an index patient or contacts, they can be asked
to respect confidentiality even if they are not legally bound
to do so. Employee and occupancy rosters are often shared
with health department personnel to facilitate identifica-
tion of contacts who should be evaluated. Confidential-
ity of these records also must be safeguarded.
• Other medical conditions besides TB. Legal and ethi-
cal concerns for privacy and confidentiality extend
beyond TB. All personal information regarding an index
patient and contacts is afforded the same protections.
Staffing and Training
for Contact Investigations
The multiple interrelated tasks in a contact investigation
require personnel in the health department and other health-
care-delivery systems to fulfill multiple functions and skills
(Box 3). Training and continuous on-the-job supervision in
all these functions help ensure successful contact investiga-
tions.
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Job titles of personnel who conduct contact investigations
vary among jurisdictions (Box 4). State licensing boards and
other authorities govern the scope of practice of health
department personnel, and this narrows the assignment of
functions. Reflection of these licensure-governed functions is
recommended for personnel position descriptions, with spe-
cific references to contact investigations as duties.
Contact Investigations
in Special Circumstances
Contact investigations frequently involve multiple special
circumstances, but these circumstances typically are not of
substantive concern. This section lists special challenges and
suggests how the general guidance in other sections of this
document can be adapted in response.
Outbreaks
A TB outbreak indicates potential extensive transmission.
An outbreak implies that 1) a TB patient was contagious, 2)
contacts were exposed for a substantial period, and 3) the
interval since exposure has been sufficient for infection to
progress to disease. An outbreak investigation involves several
overlapping contact investigations, with a surge in the need
for public health resources. More emphasis on active case find-
ing is recommended, which can result in more contacts than
usual having chest radiographs and specimen collection for
mycobacteriologic assessment.
Definitions for TB outbreaks are relative to the local con-
text. Outbreak cases can be distinguished from other cases
only when certain association in time, location, patient char-
acteristics, or M. tuberculosis attributes (e.g., drug resistance
or genotype) become apparent. In low-incidence jurisdictions,
any temporal cluster is suspicious for an outbreak. In places
where cases are more common, clusters can be obscured by
the baseline incidence until suspicion is triggered by a notice-
able increase, a sentinel event (e.g., pediatric cases), or geno-
typically related M. tuberculosis isolates.
On average in the United States, 1% of contacts (priority
status not specified) have TB disease at the time that they are
BOX 3. Specialized functions for contact investigations
Interviewing






Media relations and public education
Patient education
Medical evaluation and assessment







SOURCES: CDC. Essential components of a tuberculosis prevention and
control program. MMWR 1995;44(No. RR-11):1–17; CDC. Core
curriculum on tuberculosis: what the clinician should know. 4th ed. Atlanta,
GA: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC; 2000.
BOX 4. Positions and titles used in contact investigation
literature
Tuberculosis (TB) program manger
DOT (directly observed therapy) worker
Case manager
Nurse epidemiologist
Public health nurse (PHN)
Public information/media relations officer
Disease investigation specialist























SOURCE: CDC. Core curriculum on tuberculosis: what the clinician
should know. 4th ed. Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and Human
Services, CDC; 2000.
Vol. 54 / RR-15 Recommendations and Reports 25
evaluated (50). This disease prevalence is >100 times greater
than that predicted for the United States overall. Nonetheless,
this 1% average rate is not helpful in defining outbreaks,
because substantial numbers of contacts are required for a sta-
tistically meaningful comparison to the 1% average.
A working definition of “outbreak” is recommended for
planning investigations. A recommended definition is a situ-
ation that is consistent with either of two sets of criteria:
• during (and because of ) a contact investigation, two or
more contacts are identified as having active TB, regard-
less of their assigned priority; or
• any two or more cases occurring <1 year of each other are
discovered to be linked, and the linkage is established out-
side of a contact investigation (e.g., two patients who
received a diagnosis of TB outside of a contact investiga-
tion are found to work in the same office, and only one or
neither of the persons was listed as a contact to the other).
The linkage between cases should be confirmed by
genotyping results if isolates have been obtained (122). Any
secondary case that is unexpectedly linked to a known index
patient represents a potential failure of certain contact inves-
tigation, and therefore the strategy for the original investiga-
tion should be reassessed to determine whether the strategy
for finding contacts was optimal and whether the priorities
were valid or if additional contacts must be sought. If a sec-
ondary case occurred because treatment for a known contact
with LTBI was not started or completed, then the strategies
for treatment and completion should be reviewed.
An outbreak increases the urgency of investigations and
places greater demands on the health department. Therefore,
whenever possible, a suspected linkage between cases should
be corroborated by genotyping results before intensifying an
investigation. Even if genotypes match, an epidemiologic
investigation is required for determining probable transmis-
sion linkages (122–125).
In an outbreak, contacts can be exposed to more than one
case, and cases and contacts can be interrelated through mul-
tiple social connections which complicate efforts to set priori-
ties. Social network analysis offers an alternative framework
(see Other Topics) (126). The risk factors contributing to a
specific outbreak should be determined, because these find-
ings will affect the investigation and inform the strategy.
Contagious TB undiagnosed or untreated for an extended
period, or an extremely contagious case. The challenges cre-
ated by the extended infectious period include the patient’s
inability to remember persons and places and a greater number
of contacts in a greater number of places. Social network tech-
niques (see other topics) and setting-based investigations are
proxy methods for finding contacts. A highly contagious case,
sometimes with several pulmonary cavities or laryngeal disease,
suggests a greater number of high-priority contacts. If an out-
break has been discovered, and if the patient has one of these
forms of TB, any contacts who have indeterminate exposure
data should be classified as high priority.
Sometimes a delay in treating TB is caused by failure to
suspect TB or to report it. Opportunities for educating the
providers should be pursued immediately, especially if con-
tacts are likely to seek health care from the same providers.
Multidrug resistance can cause prolonged contagiousness if
a standard treatment regimen for drug susceptible TB is being
administered. This problem can be prevented by
obtaining initial susceptibility results, by monitoring the
patient’s condition and response to therapy, and by suspect-
ing MDR TB when the patient has treatment failure, relapse,
or slow recovery from illness (127).
Source patient visiting multiple sites. A TB patient who
has an active, complex social life and who frequents multiple
sites where transmission of M. tuberculosis could occur is also
less likely to be able to name all contacts. Proxy interviews
(see Investigating the Index Patient and Sites of Transmission)
and setting-based investigations are methods that supplement
the patient’s recall.
Patient and contacts in close or prolonged company.
When an outbreak has been discovered, high priority is rec-
ommended for contacts having close or prolonged exposure.
Environment promoting transmission. A small interior
space with poor ventilation can act as the focus of intense
transmission of M. tuberculosis. High priority is recommended
for all contacts who spent time with an outbreak source
patient in such spaces, even if the periods of exposure were
brief or unknown.
Certain larger environments (e.g., a warehouse worksite or
a school bus [128,129]) have been reported as sites of inten-
sive transmission when patients were highly contagious or
when patients and contacts were in prolonged company. If
the evidence from the investigation indicates a link between
the site and transmission in an outbreak, the contacts in such
a site should be designated as high priority, regardless of the
site’s characteristics.
Contacts very susceptible to disease after M. tuberculosis
infection. Urgency is required when outbreak cases are diagnosed
in contacts who are relatively more susceptible to progression
from M. tuberculosis infection to TB disease. Other contacts with
similar susceptibility should be sought. If such an outbreak
includes children aged <5 years, a source-case investigation should
be undertaken if the contagious source is unknown initially (see
Source-Case Investigations). Intensified methods for active case
finding among contacts are recommended.
Gaps in contact investigations and follow-up. Omissions,
errors, and system failures can resurface later in the form of
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secondary TB cases (i.e., an outbreak). Tracing back cases in
an outbreak indicates whether prevention opportunities were
missed in previous contact investigations or other prevention
activities (e.g., targeted testing).
Extra-virulent strain of M. tuberculosis. The existence of
such strains has not been demonstrated. Determining which
strains are more infective or pathogenic for humans is not yet
possible, and the relevance of greater/faster pathogenicity of
certain strains in laboratory animals is not fully understood
yet (58,128,130).
Congregate Settings
Overall concerns associated with congregate settings include
1) the substantial numbers of contacts, 2) incomplete infor-
mation regarding contact names and locations, 3) incomplete
data for determining priorities, 4) difficulty in maintaining
confidentiality, 5) collaboration with officials and adminis-
trators who are unfamiliar with TB, 6) legal implications, and
7) media coverage. Certain settings require intensified onsite
approaches for ensuring that contacts are completely evalu-
ated and for meeting objectives for treating LTBI. Requests
for supplemental resources are recommended when the scope
or duration of an investigation is expected to disrupt other
essential TB control functions.
Maintaining confidentiality for an index patient is difficult
if the patient was conspicuously ill or was absent from the
setting while ill (see Data Management and Evaluation of
Contact Investigations). Permission should be sought from
the index patient before sharing information with any offi-
cials (e.g., supervisors, managers, or administrators) at the set-
ting. Collaboration with officials at the setting is essential for
obtaining access to employee and occupancy rosters, ascer-
taining contacts, performing onsite diagnostic evaluations or
treatment, and offering education to associates (e.g., classmates,
friends, or coworkers) of the index patient.
For congregate settings, the types of information for desig-
nating priorities are site specific, and therefore a customized
algorithm is required for each situation. The general concepts
of source-case characteristics, duration and proximity of
exposure, environmental factors that modify transmission, and
susceptibility of contacts to TB should be included in the
algorithm (see Decisions to Initiate a Contact Investigation,
Index Patient and Sites of Transmission, and Assigning Pri-
orities to Contacts).
The optimum approach for a setting-based investigation is
to interview and test contacts on site. If this is not possible,
then the contacts should be invited for evaluation at the health
department, which should consider having additional person-
nel or extended hours. As a last resort, contacts can be noti-
fied in writing to seek diagnostic evaluation with their own
health-care providers. In this case, the letter should inform
health-care providers regarding the TB exposure (including
drug susceptibility results), diagnostic methods (including a
5 mm skin test cut point), treatment recommendations for
LTBI, and a reference telephone number at the health depart-
ment for obtaining consultation. Health-care providers also
should receive a form for each contact that can be used to
return diagnostic results and treatment decisions to the health
department.
Certain congregate settings create opportunities for efficient
onsite supervision of treatment for numerous contacts. Treat-
ment can be delivered by having health department personnel
visit the setting twice weekly for intermittent therapy, or by
collaborating with a health professional hired by the setting.
Arrangements are needed to maintain confidentiality with this
approach. Officials and administrators at the setting are likely
to be concerned regarding liability, which can be addressed in
advance with legal counsel.
For constructive media coverage, the health department
should collaborate with the setting in focusing on clear, con-
sistent information. News reports that are factually accurate
and that correctly describe the role of the health department
can facilitate the investigation (see Communicating Through
the News Media).
Correctional Facilities
The Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis
(ACET) has issued guidance on preventing and controlling
TB in correctional facilities (131). Jails and prisons have been
implicated in TB outbreaks (132–135). Multiple factors can
hinder contact investigations. The best preparation for con-
ducting contact investigations in jails and prisons is preexist-
ing formal collaboration between correctional and public
health officials. If collaboration has not been established
before a contact investigation is needed, creating it as part of
the investigation is necessary.
Certain correctional populations have a high prevalence of
HIV infection, and reviewing the HIV testing policies, proce-
dures, and aggregate statistics is recommended. If inmates have
not been offered voluntary counseling, testing, and referral
for HIV infection, and TB exposure is suspected, offering vol-
untary HIV counseling, testing, and referral is strongly rec-
ommended.
Inmates move about within correctional facilities on both
daily and weekly schedules that can affect TB exposures. In
addition, inmates are transferred within and between jails or
prisons. Certain correctional settings have convenient, com-
prehensive longitudinal records for the locations of inmates
that are essential for drawing up contact lists, estimating ex-
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posure periods, and assigning priorities to contacts. A tour of
exposure sites within each setting helps in estimating expo-
sure intensity.
Prisons typically have onsite health services, but jails might
not. Certain prisons and jails test new inmate admissions and
employees for M. tuberculosis infection, and certain prisons
have periodic surveillance testing of employees, inmates, or
both. Health-care providers in an onsite system can provide
invaluable assistance in reviewing health records and evaluat-
ing and treating contacts. If medical record data (e.g., previ-
ous exposure and skin test results) cannot be retrieved rapidly,
health department officials should consider requesting addi-
tional resources.
Investigations in jails can be especially challenging because
of rapid turnover of inmates and crowding. The number of
contacts who had close proximity to an index patient/inmate
can be great, and yet exposure might be brief. This compli-
cates the process of assigning priorities. Unless tracking records
for inmates who were in a confined space with an infectious
TB patient allow a determination that aggregate exposure was
brief (e.g., <8 hours), these contacts should be assigned high
priority. High-priority contacts who are transferred, released,
or paroled from a correctional facility before medical evalua-
tion for TB should be traced.
Unless they have been released or paroled, prison inmates
with LTBI can complete a treatment regimen while incarcer-
ated. In contrast, inmates in jails who are contacts are unlikely to
be able to complete treatment while incarcerated. A low comple-
tion rate is anticipated when inmates are released or paroled
unless follow-through supervision can be arranged.
Workplaces
A substantial number of persons spend the majority of their
waking hours in their workplaces, which can be crowded.
Duration and proximity of exposure can be greater than for
other settings. Details regarding employment, hours, work-
ing conditions, and workplace contacts should be obtained
during the initial interview with the index patient (see Inves-
tigating the Index Patient and Sites of Transmission), and the
workplace should be toured after accounting for confidential-
ity and permission from workplace administrators or manag-
ers. Employee lists are helpful for selecting contacts, but certain
employees might have left the workplace and thus been omit-
ted from current employee lists.
Occasional customers of a business workplace (e.g., inter-
mittent visitors to a fast-food restaurant) should be designated
as low-priority contacts. Customers who visit a business work-
place repeatedly should be assigned priorities as in other
investigations (see Assigning Priorities to Contacts), especially
susceptible or vulnerable contacts.
Workplace administrators or managers are likely to express
concern regarding liability, lost productivity, and media cov-
erage. In addition, they might have limited obligations to pro-
tect patient confidentiality. All these issues can be addressed
during planning. For example, the assistance of the health
department’s media relations specialist can be offered to the
workplace. For questions of liability and requirements under
law, discussions between the health department’s and the
workplace’s legal counsels are recommended.
Hospitals and Other Health-Care Settings
Nearly every type of health-care setting has been implicated
in transmission of M. tuberculosis, and guidance on preventing
transmission has been provided by CDC, the Healthcare Infec-
tion Control Practices Advisory Committee, and other organi-
zations (42,136). State governments have different degrees of
regulatory authority over health-care settings. Personnel collabo-
rating with hospitals and other health-care entities should have
knowledge of applicable legal requirements.
Infection control practitioners, although vital partners in
these settings, might not be familiar with TB contact investi-
gations. Multiple settings have engineers who can describe
and test the environmental systems. Such an investigation
should be planned jointly as a collaboration between the set-
ting and the health department. Initial discussions should
include data sharing and divisions of responsibilities. Liabil-
ity, regulations, confidentiality, media coverage, and occupa-
tional safety are complex for health-care settings. Occupational
Safety and Health Administration rules, which are interpreted
differently by different jurisdictions, might require hospital
administrators to report when employees are reported to be
infected from occupational exposure. Public health officials
should consider inviting legal counsel to the initial planning
sessions with health-care administrators.
The majority of health-care settings have policies for test-
ing employees for M. tuberculosis infection at the time of
employment and, in settings where exposure is anticipated,
periodically thereafter. Test results are helpful as baseline data.
The availability of baseline results for contacts who were
patients or clients of the setting is variable; long-term care
facilities might have these data.
Schools
This category includes child care centers, preschools, pri-
mary through secondary schools, vocational schools that
replace or immediately follow secondary school, and colleges
or universities. Contact investigations at juvenile detention
centers and adult education systems should be managed along
the same lines as investigations conducted in correctional set-
tings and in workplaces, respectively.
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Early collaboration with school officials and community
members is recommended when considering an investigation
related to a school, even if preliminary information suggests
that an investigation is unnecessary. The typical features of con-
tact investigations in schools are the potentially substantial num-
bers of contacts and difficulties in assigning priorities to contacts
who have undetermined durations and proximities of expo-
sure. The potential is great for controversies among public health
officials, school officials, and the guardians of the children.
The presence of TB in schools often generates publicity.
Ideally, the health department should communicate with the
school and parents (and guardians) before any media report a
story. TB control officials should anticipate media coverage
and plan a collaborative strategy (see Communicating Through
the News Media).
Consent, assent, and disclosure of information are more
complex for nonemancipated minors than for adults. Each
interaction with a minor is also a potential interaction with
the family. The health department typically has limited alter-
natives for evaluating a minor if permission is not granted.
Anticipatory legal consultation is recommended.
Public health officials should visit the school to check indoor
spaces, observe general conditions, and interview maintenance
personnel regarding ventilation. Class assignment records help
in listing contacts, estimating durations of exposure, and set-
ting priorities. However, certain schools purge these files at the
end of each school year, in which case interviews with students
and personnel are necessary to list contacts.
Extramural activities add other exposure sites and contacts.
Clubs, sports, and certain classes require additional informa-
tion gained from interviewing the patient, the patient’s guard-
ians, and school personnel. For patients who ride school buses,
a bus company might keep a roster of riders with addresses.
The strategy for contact investigations in child care centers,
preschools, and primary schools depends on whether the index
patient is a child (i.e., preadolescent) or an adult (e.g., a teacher
or caregiver). The potential infectiousness of an adult in the
school should be determined (see Decisions to Initiate a Con-
tact Investigation and Investigating the Index Patient and Sites
of Transmission).
In a source-case investigation of a child aged <5 years who
has TB and who attends preschool or child care, all adults in
these settings should be included if the source case has not
been located in the family or household (see Source-Case
Investigations). Certain home-based child care centers include
adults who do not provide child care but who still share air-
space with the children. Source-case investigations should not
be pursued in primary and higher-level schools unless other
evidence points to the school as the focus.
In secondary and higher levels of education, students usually
have adult-form TB, and infectiousness can be estimated by
the standard criteria (see Decisions to Initiate a Contact Inves-
tigation and Investigating the Index Patient and Sites of Trans-
mission). With advancing education, academic schedules and
extramural social schedules become more complex, and the
information reported by the index patient is more important
for a thorough investigation than it is for younger children.
Multiple jurisdictions have pre-employment requirements
for TB clearance screening (e.g., a test for M. tuberculosis
infection) at schools or daycare settings, and certain juris-
dictions require TB clearance for entering students. Certain
colleges and universities also have these requirements. These
baseline data are helpful for interpreting results from the
investigation.
Schools that have onsite health services can administer DOT
to students with LTBI, or the health department can send
workers twice weekly to provide intermittent therapy. This
approach should be coordinated with the annual school cycle.
School breaks, vacations, graduations, and transfers disrupt
the contact investigation. In collaboration with school officials,
the health department can notify, by mail, students and other
contacts who will be unavailable at the school. These contacts
should be referred for evaluation at the health department.
Contacts seeking care from their own health-care providers
should receive written instructions to give their providers.
Shelters and Other Settings Providing
Services for Homeless Persons
ACET and CDC have provided guidance for providing TB
control services to homeless persons and for preventing TB
transmission at settings providing services to them (137). The
challenges that can be anticipated for a contact investigation
involving a homeless TB patient include difficulty locating
the patient and contacts if they are mobile, episodic incar-
ceration, migration from one jurisdiction to another, psychi-
atric illnesses (including chemical dependency disorders) that
hinder communication or participation, and preexisting medi-
cal conditions (in particular, HIV infection). When names or
locations of specific contacts are unknown, interviews with
the patient and potential contacts should focus on social net-
works and settings, including correctional facilities.
One surrogate for degree of exposure at an overnight shelter
is the bed/cot assignment. The proximity and duration of over-
lap should be estimated as closely as possible for selecting high-
priority contacts. Certain daytime-use settings keep sign-in lists,
but these might lack information regarding overlap of visits.
Homeless persons frequently seek health care from multiple
volunteer providers, halfway houses, chemical dependency
treatment programs, community clinics, urgent care centers,
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and hospital emergency departments. Consultation and assis-
tance from health-care providers in these systems can be help-
ful. This also creates an opportunity for collaboration, contact
ascertainment, and mutual education.
Site visits and interviews are crucial, because the social com-
munities of homeless persons are likely to vary by situation. A
contact investigation presents an opportunity to review the
screening and testing services and to offer assistance with these
and other means of decreasing transmission of M. tuberculosis
(e.g., environmental controls). However, transmission also
could occur at sites besides shelters (e.g., jails, taverns, aban-
doned buildings, and cars).
Settings providing services to homeless persons are affected
by policies, laws, and regulations according to their service
population, location, and funding sources, and certain of these
issues are relevant for the contact investigation. Access to visi-
tation and occupancy rosters (or logs) and to other informa-
tion regarding persons, vital for listing contacts and
determining priorities, might be restricted by law (e.g., at set-
tings that provide treatment for substance-abuse disorders),
and the terms of access should be negotiated.
Low treatment-completion rates have been reported for treat-
ment of LTBI diagnosed at homeless shelters (137–140). TB
control officials should work with setting administrators to
offer onsite supervised intermittent treatment. Sites with more
stable populations are likely to benefit most from this approach.
Transportation Modes
Transmission of M. tuberculosis has been confirmed on mili-
tary vessels at sea, commercial aircraft, passenger trains, and
school buses (85,129,141–144). However, transmission is
unlikely unless ventilation is restricted or exposure is long or
repetitive. Investigations for these settings should be assigned
low priority unless ventilation is restricted or single-trip expo-
sure time is >8 hours (cumulative if the trip has multiple seg-
ments) as currently recommended for commercial airline
travel, or at least two separate trips were taken with the index
patient (145).
Drug or Alcohol Usage Sites
Shared sites of drug or alcohol usage (e.g., taverns and crack
houses), have been implicated as sites of M. tuberculosis trans-
mission (146,147). Potential factors are close person-to-
person proximity, repetitive exposure, and poor ventilation.
Routine interviews might not generate a complete contact list
for these settings, and the patient’s social network should be
explored for other information sources. Connections to cor-
rectional settings should be sought. HIV infection is associ-
ated with multiple forms of substance abuse, and HIV
counseling, testing, and referral services are recommended.
Special Sites Not Under Jurisdiction
Examples of sites that are not under the jurisdiction of the
local or state health department are those under the jurisdic-
tion of the U.S. government (e.g., military bases), diplomatic
missions, or reservations for American Indian/Alaska Native
tribes. If these sites have their own health-care systems, the
health department can offer technical consultation and can
request data from contact investigations. At sites that do not
have health-care systems, agreements can be made between
local TB control officials and the onsite authorities to del-
egate the public health response to the health department.
Index Patient Unable to Participate
Approximately 8% of pulmonary TB patients with AFB
detected on sputum microscopy have no contacts listed
(17,50). TB patients who have few or no contacts listed are
more likely to be homeless or to have died (i.e., before an
interview could be conducted). This implies that the patients
might have had contacts, but learning who the contacts were
is difficult. Social-network information, setting-based
investigations, and proxy methods are recommended to supple-
ment the contact list. In addition, any person in whom a case
of pulmonary TB was diagnosed at death indicates that a pos-
sible delay in diagnosis has occurred, which could infer
increased and prolonged infectiousness and a need to increase
the scope of the investigation.
MDR TB
The occurrence of MDR TB does not change recommen-
dations for assigning contact priorities. Special consideration
should be given to instances when resistance is acquired during
treatment or when drug resistance was detected late during
the treatment course, because these patients might have had
prolonged periods of infectiousness. Treatment regimens for
infected contacts require expert consultation (see Treatment
for Contacts with LTBI) (6).
Interjurisdictional Contact
Investigations
Contact investigations that overlap multiple jurisdictional
areas require joint strategies for finding contacts, having them
evaluated, treating the infected contacts, and gathering data.
A different solution usually is required for each situation.
Multiple jurisdictions within the United States. The
index patient and associated contacts might have stable resi-
dences, but travel among sites in different jurisdictions. The
health department that counts the index patient is responsible
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for leading the investigation and notifying the health depart-
ments in other jurisdictions regarding contacts residing in those
jurisdictions. Notifications should include requests for follow-
through results of contact evaluation and treatment. A team of
representatives from the multiple health departments can
increase the efficiency of such an investigation by planning the
overall strategy together and monitoring the progress.
Migratory workers. ACET has issued specific TB preven-
tion and control recommendations for migratory agricultural
workers (148). An investigation for any migratory workers
requires a strategy that is adjusted to their migration and work
schedule. The workers’ itinerary should be ascertained during
initial planning, and health departments in successive destina-
tions should be notified. A selection from among three general
types of contact record management is recommended: 1) the
transfer of patient records from one health department to the
next on the itinerary; 2) the continual referral of information
to a single coordinating health department throughout the
investigation; or 3) patient ownership of records, with each
patient responsible for keeping information while moving.
Because of the duration of treatment, treating LTBI is the most
difficult phase. Certain seasonal workers remain in one place as
long as several months during off-season, and this period should
be used to deliver as much treatment as possible.
Contagious TB patient traveling within the United States.
Officials from the health department that initially encoun-
tered the patient should interview the patient to gather as much
identifying and locating information as possible for contacts
who were visited during the patient’s travels. These data should
be referred to the jurisdictions in which the contacts are located.
The jurisdiction that counts the index patient is assigned
responsibility for managing the contact investigation overall.
International contact investigations. The United States
and Mexico participate in the Referral System for Binational
TB Patients Pilot Project, which coordinates follow-up care
when a TB patient moves between these two countries, mainly
between participating jurisdictions. Cure TB also contributes
to continuity of care in other regions of the two countries.
Neither of these systems includes contact investigations at
present. TBNet is a health-care system for migratory agricul-
tural workers who are receiving treatment for LTBI and thus
includes contacts. For cases or contacts in Canada, U.S. health
departments should notify TB control coordinators in pro-
vincial health departments.
Unusual Events Causing Exposure
to M. tuberculosis Complex
The normal mode of transmission is person to person by
the airborne route. Unusual events (e.g., laboratory accidents)
also can cause M. tuberculosis transmission. In contrast,
M. bovis transmission usually occurs via infected dairy prod-
ucts, which is preventable by pasteurization.
Animals with human-type or bovine TB. Multiple mam-
malian and certain nonmammalian species are susceptible to
human-type TB, presumably through exposure to persons with
TB who are contagious. Multiple animal hosts also can con-
tract bovine TB (i.e., infection with M. bovis), probably from
exposure to other infected animals or from consuming
infected dairy products or contaminated feed.
Standard methods for diagnosing M. tuberculosis infection
and disease have not been described for the majority of spe-
cies. Evaluation and management of an animal exposed to
M. tuberculosis should be referred to a veterinarian, who can
consult with the state veterinarian. Animal-to-human trans-
mission of human TB in a household has not been confirmed,
and the human contacts should be designated as low priority.
However, determining the source of M. tuberculosis infection
for an animal with TB is recommended.
The degree of risk for aerosol-inducing procedures (e.g.,
intubation, bronchoscopy, or necroscopy) performed on an
animal having TB is unknown. However, these procedures
are likely to create infectious aerosols. If infection control pre-
cautions for preventing M. tuberculosis transmission were not
implemented during the procedures, then in-room contacts
are assigned high priority.
The evaluation and management of animals exposed to
M. bovis should be referred to a veterinarian. Cases of M. bovis
in animals should be reported to the state veterinarian. Animal-
to-human transmission of M. bovis from necropsy procedures
has been confirmed (149).
Patients who acquire M. bovis infection from ingestion are
more likely to have extrapulmonary TB (e.g., scrofula or peri-
tonitis), but pulmonary disease is possible. Contact investiga-
tions regarding persons who have pulmonary TB caused by
M. bovis should be planned according to the guidelines pro-
vided in this report. However, the potential for transmission
is less clear. Current and proposed tests for infection (e.g., the
TST and QuantiFERON®-TB Gold [QFT-G, manufactured
by Cellestis Limited, Carnegie, Victoria, Australia]) detect
M. bovis infection, but the tests are not approved specifically
for this indication. After active M. bovis disease has been
excluded by symptom review, examination, and tests as indi-
cated by findings, suspected latent M. bovis infection should
be treated as ordinary M. tuberculosis infection.
Multiple laboratory mammals, especially nonhuman primates,
are highly susceptible to human-type TB. Federal animal wel-
fare regulations administered by the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture (http://www.nal.usda.gov/awic/legislat/awicregs.htm)
apply to laboratory animals and certain animals used in exhibi-
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tions. If such animals are exposed to infectious TB, consulta-
tion with the state veterinarian is recommended.
Microbiology laboratory accidents. Routine laboratory pro-
cedures for manipulating either patient specimens or cultured
isolates of M. tuberculosis generate infectious aerosols. Uninten-
tional events (e.g., spills outside containment areas) and system
failures can cause exposure. A contact investigation for such
scenarios should be based on the location of persons in the room
at the time of the event and the airflow in the room. Consulta-
tion with a microbiologist is recommended. In general, baseline
skin test results are available for workers in laboratories in which
M. tuberculosis is cultured or kept.
Surgical wounds, abscesses, embalming, and autopsies.
Diseased tissues are not typical sources of infection unless pro-
cedures create aerosols: water-jet irrigation, dripping fluids,
electrical cauterization, and cutting with power tools. If pro-
cedures were performed on infected tissues before infection
control precautions were instituted, then persons in the room
at the time should be designated as high-priority contacts.
Percutaneous inoculations. M. tuberculosis can cause
infection and local disease in skin or deeper tissue after direct
inoculation by a contaminated object. Percutaneous exposure
would be highly unusual in anyone except a health-care worker,
who should have a previous result from baseline testing for
infection. A 9-month INH treatment regimen should be
started if the M. tuberculosis is likely to be susceptible to it.
Treatment should be stopped if a repeat test for M. tuberculosis
is negative >8 weeks after exposure, and treatment should be
extended to the full course if the test result is positive. If the
baseline test result was positive, the full 9 months of treat-
ment is recommended. During treatment, the person should
be examined monthly for signs of local infection or spread to
regional lymph nodes.
Source-Case Investigations
A source-case investigation seeks the source of recent
M. tuberculosis infection, perhaps newly diagnosed TB disease
(43). TB disease in children aged <5 years typically indicates
that the infection must be recent. For this reason, it is a senti-
nel public health event. Young children usually do not trans-
mit TB to others, and their contacts are unlikely to be infected
because of exposure to them (150). A source-case investiga-
tion moves in the opposite direction of contact investigation,
but the principles used in contact investigation apply. Source-
case investigations concerning adults with TB disease are not
discussed in this report (42,131,151).
Source-case investigations typically have low yield for the
effort required. They are not recommended unless a TB con-
trol program is achieving its objectives (in particular, treat-
ment of infected contacts) when investigating infectious cases.
Source-Case Investigation
for a Child with TB Disease
The yield of source-case investigations for children who have
TB disease varies, typically <50% on average (152–156). Source-
case investigations can be considered for children aged <5 years.
A younger age cut-off might be advisable because the focus would
be on more recent transmission. An investigation may be started
before the diagnosis of TB is confirmed because waiting for con-
firmation can decrease the chances of finding associates.
Source-Case Investigation
for a Child with Latent
M. tuberculosis Infection
A search for the source of infection for a child who has
LTBI is unlikely to be productive (157–159). These kinds of
investigations are recommended only regarding infected chil-
dren aged <2 years and only if data are monitored to deter-
mine the value of the investigation.
Procedures for Source-Case
Investigation
Seeking a source case follows the same overall procedures as
a standard contact investigation. Parents or guardians usually
are the best informants. Such persons are termed associates.
Attention focuses on ill associates who have symptoms of TB
disease. A source-case investigation should begin with the clos-
est associates (e.g., household members).
Limited data are needed for assessing the productivity of
source-case investigations. These data include the number of
index patients investigated for their sources, the number of
associates screened for TB disease, and the number of times
that a source is found.
Other Topics
Cultural Competence
Culture refers to the integrated pattern of knowledge, beliefs,
and behavior that is passed from one generation to another
(160), including how persons act and interact. If contact
investigations are to be productive, cultural differences must
be respected and understood. Cultural competence is the
knowledge and interpersonal skills that allow health-care pro-
viders to appreciate and work with persons from cultures other
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than their own. It involves awareness of cultural differences,
self-awareness, and sensitivity to a patient’s culture and adap-
tation skills.
Language and culture are important factors in TB contact
investigations. The ability to understand cultural norms and
to bridge the gaps that exist between cultures requires train-
ing and experience. Influencing patients to participate in a
contact investigation increasingly depends on the cultural com-
petency of the health-care worker. Training that is derived from
the National Standards for Culturally and Linguistically
Appropriate Services in Health Care is recommended (161).
Language interpreters need basic knowledge regarding TB,
transmission, contact investigations, and the medical care of
contacts. Patient confidentiality is a critical element of train-
ing. The use of family-member interpreters is discouraged.
The majority of family members do not have a medical orien-
tation. Patients might feel reluctant to reveal contacts of a
family member.
Social Network Analysis
Social network analysis might offer an effective way to list
TB contacts and assign priorities to them (162–166). Social
network analyses have been tested retrospectively on TB out-
break investigations (126,167–170) and contact investigations
(171,172). However, the use of social network analysis to
improve contact investigations has not been tested prospec-
tively, the methods might require additional labor, and fur-
ther operational research is needed.
Use of Blood Tests for the Detection
of Latent M. tuberculosis Infection
The majority of experience with diagnosing M. tuberculosis
infection, especially LTBI, in contacts has been with the TST.
Newly released blood tests now have potential use for this pur-
pose. The initial QuantiFERON®-TB test (QFT) is a whole
blood assay that measures IFN-γ release in response to purified
protein derivative (PPD). Good agreement was reported with
the skin test in healthy adults being tested for LTBI, and QFT
was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
(173,174). Data are insufficient to demonstrate the accuracy of
QFT test for testing contacts, and it was not recommended for
this situation (175).
Recently, QFT-G was approved by FDA for use as an in
vitro diagnostic to aid in diagnosing M. tuberculosis infection,
including both LTBI and TB disease. This test detects the
release of IFN-γ  from lymphocytes of sensitized persons when
their blood is incubated with peptide mixtures simulating two
M. tuberculosis proteins called ESAT-6 and CFP-10. These
proteins are secreted by all M. tuberculosis and pathogenic
M. bovis strains, but are absent from all BCG vaccine strains
and commonly encountered non-tuberculous mycobacteria.
Therefore, QFT-G offers the possibility of detecting
M. tuberculosis infection with greater specificity than has been
possible previously with tests that used tuberculin PPD as the
TB antigen (175,176).
CDC recommends that QFT-G can be used in all circum-
stances in which the TST is currently used, including contact
investigations (177). QFT-G can be used in place of and not
in addition to the TST. A positive QFT-G result should prompt
the same evaluation and management as a positive TST. No
reason typically exists to follow a positive QFT-G with a TST.
For persons with recent contact to infectious TB, negative
QFT-G results typically should be confirmed with a repeat
test performed 8–10 weeks after the end of exposure. Studies
to identify the most appropriate times to re-test contacts with
QFT-G have not been reported. Until more specific data are
available, the timing of QFT-G testing should be similar to
that used for the TST.
Concern has been expressed that the QFT-G test might be
somewhat less sensitive than the TST in detecting LTBI (177).
As with a negative TST, a negative QFT-G result alone should
not be used to exclude M. tuberculosis infection in severely
immunosuppressed adults, children aged <5 years, or patients
about to undergo treatment with TNF-α inhibitors, in whom
the consequences of accepting a false-negative result could be
especially severe.
Another blood test for detection of infection, the ELISPOT
test (marketed as T-SPOT-TB), is similar in principle to QFT
ELISPOT results correlate with TB exposure risk better than
skin test results for contacts of pulmonary TB patients), and
like QFT-G, it appears able to differentiate between BCG vac-
cination and M. tuberculosis infection (178,179). ELISPOT
has not yet been approved for use in the United States.
Additional resources regarding tuberculosis (TB) contact
investigations are available from the following organizations:
• CDC, National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Preven-
tion, Division of Tuberculosis Elimination (available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/tb)
— Self-Study Modules on Tuberculosis 6–9 [Module 6:
Contact Investigations]
— Effective TB Interviewing for TB Contact Investiga-
tions
— Effective TB Interviewing for Contact Investigation:
Facilitator-Led Training Guide
— Effective TB Interviewing for Contact Investigation:
Facilitator-Self-Study Modules
— Patient Education Booklet, “Contact Investigations” (Lan-
guages: English, Tagalog, Vietnamese, and Spanish)
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— TB Education and Training resources Web Site (avail-
able at http://www.findTBresources.org);
• Northeastern National Tuberculosis Center (available at
http://www.umdnj.edu/ntbcweb)
— Performance Guidelines for Contact Investigation: The
TB Interview—A Supervisor’s Guide for the Devel-
opment and Assessment of Interviewing Skills
— TB Interviewing for Contact Investigation: A Practi-
cal Resource for the Healthcare Worker
— TB Simulated Patients: A Training Resource for the
Contact Investigation Interview
— Performance Guidelines: A Supervisor’s Guide for the
Development and Assessment of Field Investigation
Skills
— TB Field Investigation: A Resource for the Investigator
— Conducting a TB-Education Session as Part of the
Congregate Setting Investigation
— Evaluating Congregate Setting Investigations in
Tuberculosis Control;
• Charles P. Felton Model TB Center (available at http://
www.harlemtbcenter.org)
— Addressing HIV/AIDS Issues in TB Contact Investi-
gations;
• Francis J. Curry National Tuberculosis Center (available
at http://www.nationaltbcenter.edu)
— Contact Investigation in a Worksite Toolbox
— Quality Improvement for TB Case Management: An
Online Course
— Making the Connection: An Introduction to Inter-
pretation Skills for TB Control
— Facilitating TB Outreach: Community Workers and
Hard-To-Reach TB Populations;
• Southeastern National Tuberculosis Center (available at
http://http://SNTC.medicine.ufl.edu); and
• Heartland National Tuberculosis Center (available at
http://www.heartlandtbcenter.edu).
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Appendix A
Glossary
specimens. It also creates a high risk for M. tuberculosis trans-
mission to health-care workers if it is used on a patient who
has TB (even if the patient is smear negative), because the
procedure induces coughing.
Bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL). A procedure for collecting
respiratory specimens from the airway, typically during bron-
choscopy. Sterile saline is flushed through an airway, and the
resultant mixture of cells, secretions, and saline is aspirated
for studies (e.g., microscopy and culture).
Case. A particular instance of a disease (e.g., TB). A case is
detected, documented, and reported.
Cavity (pulmonary). A hole in the lung parenchyma, typi-
cally not involving the pleural space. Although multiple causes
can account for a lung cavity, and its appearance is similar
regardless of its cause, in pulmonary TB, it results from the
destruction of pulmonary tissue by direct bacterial invasion
and an immune interaction triggered by M. tuberculosis. A
tuberculous cavity large enough to see with a normal chest
radiograph predicts infectiousness.
Contact. Refers to someone who has been exposed to
M. tuberculosis infection by sharing air space with a person
with infectious TB.
Contagious. Refers to TB disease of either the lungs or the
throat that has been demonstrated to have caused transmis-
sion to other persons or the patient who has TB disease.
Conversion. A change in the result of a test for M. tubercu-
losis infection that is interpreted to indicate a change from
being uninfected to infected. With the tuberculin skin test,
an increase of >10 mm in induration size during <2 years is
defined as a conversion. A conversion is presumptive evidence
of new M. tuberculosis infection and poses an increased risk
for progression to TB disease. The term is applied to contacts
only when previous skin test results are available. A change
in tuberculin status during the window period is not neces-
sarily consistent with this definition.
Delayed-type hypersensitivity (DTH). Cell-mediated
inflammatory reaction to an antigen that is recognized by the
immune system, typically because of previous exposure to the
same or similar antigens. Cell-mediated reactions are contrasted
with an antibody (or humoral) response. DTH typically peaks
48–72 hours after exposure to the antigen.
Directly observed therapy (DOT). An adherence-enhancing
strategy in which a health-care worker or other trained person
watches a patient swallow each dose of medication and is
The following terms and abbreviations are used in this report.
Acid-fast bacilli (AFB). Microorganisms that are distin-
guished by their retention of specific stains even after being
rinsed with an acid solution. The majority of AFB in patient
specimens are mycobacteria, including species other than
Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex. A positive nucleic acid
amplification (NAA) or culture result is needed for confirma-
tion of M. tuberculosis complex. The relative concentration of
AFB per unit area on a slide (the smear grade) is associated
with infectiousness.
Anergy. A condition wherein a person has diminished abil-
ity to exhibit delayed T-cell hypersensitivity reaction to anti-
gens because of a condition or situation resulting in altered
immune function. When referring to inability to react to a
skin test, the correct term is cutaneous anergy. Skin tests for
anergy (i.e., control antigens) have poor predictive value and
are not recommended.
Associate contact. A person who is somehow affiliated with
a patient who has noninfectious tuberculosis (TB) or with
another contact. Often used in connection with source-case
investigations; does not imply an M. tuberculosis transmission
pathway.
Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG). A vaccine for tuberculo-
sis named after the French scientists Calmette and Guérin.
The vaccine is effective in preventing disseminated and
meningeal TB disease in infants and young children. It might
have approximately 50% efficacy for preventing smear-
diagnosed pulmonary TB in adults. It is used in multiple coun-
tries where TB disease is endemic.
Boosting. When nonspecific or remote sensitivity to
tuberculin (purified protein derivative [PPD] in the skin test)
wanes or disappears with time, subsequent tuberculin skin
tests can restore the sensitivity. This is called boosting or the
booster phenomenon. An initially limited reaction size is fol-
lowed by a larger reaction size on a later test, which can be
confused with a conversion or a recent M. tuberculosis infec-
tion. Two-step testing is used to distinguish new infections
from boosted reactions in infection-control surveillance pro-
grams, but this method is not recommended for testing con-
tacts.
Bronchoscopy. A procedure for examining the lower respi-
ratory tract that requires inserting the end of an endoscopic
instrument through the mouth or nose (or tracheostomy) and
into the respiratory tree. It can be used to obtain diagnostic
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accountable to the public health system. DOT is the preferred
method of care for all patients with TB disease and is a pre-
ferred option for patients under treatment for latent infection.
Disseminated TB. See Miliary TB.
Drug-susceptibility test. A laboratory determination to
assess whether an M. tuberculosis complex isolate is suscep-
tible or resistant to anti-TB drugs that are added to mycobac-
terial growth medium. The results predict whether a specific
drug is likely to be effective in treating TB disease caused by
that isolate.
Enabler. A practical item given to a patient for making
adherence (e.g., to treatment or to clinic appointments) easier.
Exposure. The condition of being subjected to something
(e.g., an infectious agent) that could have an effect. A person
exposed to M. tuberculosis does not necessarily become infected.
Much of the work in a TB contact investigation is dedicated
to learning who was exposed and, of these, who became
infected.
Exposure period. The coincident period when a contact
shared the same air space as a person with TB during the
infectious period.
Exposure site. A location that the index patient visited dur-
ing the infectious period (e.g., a school, bar, bus, or residence).
Immunocompromised and immunosuppressed. Condi-
tions in which at least part of the immune system is function-
ing at less than normal capacity. According to some style
experts, immunocompromised is the broader term, and
immunosuppressed is restricted to conditions with iatrogenic
causes, including treatments for another condition. Some
immunocompromised conditions increase the likelihood that
M. tuberculosis infection will progress to TB disease. Certain
conditions also make TB disease or infection from M. tubercu-
losis more difficult to diagnose because manifestations of TB
disease differ, and tests for infection rely on an intact immune
system.
Incentive. A gift given to patients to encourage or acknowl-
edge their adherence to treatment.
Index. The first case or patient that comes to attention as
an indicator of a potential public health problem. Contrast
with Source.
Induration. The firmness in the skin test reaction. Indura-
tion is produced by immune-cell infiltration in response to
tuberculin antigen that was introduced into the skin. It is
measured by palpation transversely, and the result is recorded
in millimeters (mm). The measurement is compared to guide-
lines to determine whether the test result is classified as posi-
tive or negative.
Infection. A condition in which microorganisms have
entered the body and typically have elicited immune responses.
M. tuberculosis infection might progress to TB disease. The
expression M. tuberculosis infection includes both latent
infection and TB disease. Latent M. tuberculosis infection or
latent tuberculosis infection (LTBI) is an asymptomatic con-
dition that follows the initial infection; the infection is still
present but is dormant (and believed not to be currently pro-
gressive or invasive). TB disease is determined by finding ana-
tomic changes caused by advancing infection (e.g., shadows
from infiltrates on a chest radiograph) or by noting symp-
toms (e.g., malaise, feverishness, or cough), and typically by
both. Positive culture results for M. tuberculosis complex typi-
cally are interpreted as both an indication of TB disease and
its confirmation, but infecting organisms can be obtained from
patients who have no other evidence of disease.
Infectious. Refers either to TB disease of the lungs or throat,
which has the potential to cause transmission to other per-
sons, or to the patient who has TB disease.
Isoniazid (INH). A highly active anti-TB chemotherapeu-
tic agent that is a basis of treatment for TB disease and latent
infection.
Laryngeal TB. A highly infectious form of TB disease, with
erosive, exudative invasion of the larynx.
Latent M. tuberculosis infection (or latent tuberculosis
infection [LTBI]). See Infection.
Mantoux method. A skin test performed by intradermally
injecting 0.1 mL of PPD tuberculin solution into the volar or
dorsal surface of the forearm. This is the recommended method
for tuberculin skin testing.
Meningeal TB. A highly dangerous and difficult-to-
diagnose form of TB disease with infectious invasion of the
tissues covering the brain. Often indolent but uniformly fatal
if untreated, at times it is diagnosed too late to save the patient’s
life or prevent permanent disability.
Miliary TB. Sometimes referred to as disseminated TB. A
dangerous, and difficult to diagnose, form of rapidly progress-
ing TB disease that extends throughout the body. Uniformly
fatal if untreated, sometimes it is diagnosed too late to save a
life. Derives its names from a pathognomonic chest radio-
graph, but certain patients with this condition have normal
findings or ordinary infiltrates on the chest radiograph.
Multidrug-resistant TB (MDR TB). TB disease caused by
an M. tuberculosis strain that is resistant to at least INH and
rifampin. Treatment regimens for curing MDR TB are long,
expensive, and difficult to tolerate. The cure rate depends on
the susceptibility of M. tuberculosis to alternative chemo-
therapy.
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Mycobacterium bovis (M. bovis). A member organism of
M. tuberculosis complex and the causative infectious agent of
TB in cattle. It also causes infection and disease in humans,
who become infected by consuming unpasteurized dairy prod-
ucts from tuberculous cows. Human M. bovis TB disease has
certain distinctive characteristics but in practical terms is
indistinguishable from human-variant TB. Human pulmo-
nary M. bovis TB disease probably is transmissible to other
humans by the airborne route, and secondary cases can result,
especially among vulnerable contacts.
Mycobacterium tuberculosis (M. tuberculosis). The name-
sake member organism of M. tuberculosis complex, and the
most common causative infectious agent of TB disease in
humans. At times, the species name refers to the entire
M. tuberculosis complex, which includes M. bovis and five other
related species.
Nucleic acid amplification (NAA). A laboratory method
used to target and amplify a single DNA or RNA sequence
for detecting and identifying (typically) a microorganism. NAA
tests for M. tuberculosis complex are sensitive and specific; they
can accelerate confirmation  of pulmonary TB disease.
Purified protein derivative (PPD) tuberculin. A material
used in diagnostic tests for M. tuberculosis infection. In the
United States, PPD solution (5 tuberculin units per 0.1 mL)
is approved for administration as an intradermal injection as
a diagnostic aid for M. tuberculosis infection (latent infection
or TB disease). PPD tuberculin also was one of the antigens
in the first-generation QuantiFERON-TB test.
QuantiFERON®-TB test. An in vitro cytokine assay that
detects cell-mediated immune response (see also DTH) to
M. tuberculosis in heparinized whole blood from venipunc-
ture. This test requires only a single patient encounter, and
the result can be ready <1 day. In 2005, QuantiFERON®-TB
is being replaced by QuantiFERON®-TB Gold, which has
greater specificity because of its synthetic antigens.
QuantiFERON®-TB Gold appears capable of distinguishing
between the sensitization caused by M. tuberculosis infection
and that caused by BCG vaccination.
Radiography. The diagnostic imaging techniques (includ-
ing plain-film chest radiographs and computerized tomogra-
phy) that rely on degrees of X-radiation transmission related
to differences in tissue densities.
Secondary (TB) case. A new case of TB disease that is
attributed to recent (i.e., <2 years) transmission as part of a
scenario under investigation. Technically, all cases are second-
ary, in the sense that they arise from other cases that are con-
tagious.
Secondary (or “second-generation”) transmission. Trans-
mission of M. tuberculosis from persons with secondary cases
(see Secondary (TB) case). This creates a chain of transmis-
sion, and if secondary transmission is identified as part of a
contact investigation, the scenario can be classified as an out-
break.
Smear. A laboratory technique for preparing a specimen so
bacteria can be visualized microscopically. Material from the
specimen is spread onto a glass slide (and typically dried and
stained). Smear, stain, and microscopy methods for mycobac-
teria are specific to this genus (see AFB). The slide can be
scanned by light or fluorescent high-power microscopy. These
methods require ongoing quality assurance for prompt and
reliable results. The results for sputum AFB smears typically
are reported as numbers of AFB per high-powered micros-
copy field, or else as a graded result, from no AFB to 4+ AFB.
The quantity of stained organisms is associated with degree of
infectiousness.
Source case or patient. The case or person that was the
original source of infection for secondary cases or contacts.
The source case can be, but is not necessarily, the index case.
Specimen. Any bodily fluid, secretion, or tissue sent to a
laboratory for testing.
Sputum. Mucus containing secretions coughed up from
within the lungs. Tests of sputum (e.g., smear and culture)
can confirm pulmonary TB disease. Sputum is different from
saliva or nasal secretions, which are unsatisfactory specimens
for detecting TB disease. However, specimens suspected to be
inadequate should still be processed because positive cultures
can still be obtained and may be the only bacteriologic indi-
cation of disease.
Suspected TB. A tentative diagnosis of TB that will be con-
firmed or excluded by subsequent testing. Cases should not
remain in this category for >3 months.
Symptomatic. A term applied to a patient with health-
related complaints (i.e., symptoms) that might indicate the
presence of disease. At times, the term is applied to a medical
condition (e.g., symptomatic pulmonary TB).
TB disease. See discussion under Infection.
Treatment for LTBI. Treatment that prevents the progres-
sion of infection into TB disease.
Tuberculin. A precipitate made from a sterile filtrate of
M. tuberculosis culture medium.
Tuberculin skin test (TST). A diagnostic aid for finding
M. tuberculosis infection. A small dose of tuberculin (see also
Mantoux method and PPD) is injected just beneath the sur-
face of the skin by the Mantoux method, and the area is
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examined for induration by palpation 48–72 hours after the
injection. Indurated margins should be read transverse (per-
pendicular) to the long axis of the forearm.
Tuberculin skin test conversion. See Conversion.
Tuberculosis (TB). A clinically active, symptomatic dis-
ease caused by infection with a member of the M. tuberculosis
complex.
Two-step (tuberculin) skin test. A procedure used for
baseline skin testing of persons who will periodically receive
TSTs (e.g., health-care workers or residents of long-term–care
facilities) to reduce the likelihood of mistaking a boosted
reaction for a new infection. If an initial TST result is classi-
fied as negative, a second test is repeated 1–3 weeks later. If
the reaction to the second TST is positive, it probably repre-
sents a boosted reaction, indicating that the infection was most
likely in the past and not recent. If the second TST is also
negative, the person is classified as not being infected. Two-
step skin testing has no place in contact investigations or in
other circumstances in which ongoing transmission of
M. tuberculosis is suspected.
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Appendix B
Recommendations for the Investigation of Contacts
of Persons with Infectious Tuberculosis (TB)
• The place of residence for the index patient should be
visited <3 business days of initiating the contact investi-
gation.
• All potential settings for transmission should be visited
<5 working days of initiating the contact investigation.
• The contact list and priority assignments (see Assigning
Priorities to Contacts) should be written into an investi-
gative plan.
• Information regarding the index patient should be reas-
sessed at least weekly until drug-susceptibility results are
available for the Mycobacterium tuberculosis isolate, for 2
months after notification, or until infectiousness has
diminished, whichever is longer.
• At 1–2 weeks after the first interview, the index patient
should be interviewed again as necessary for clarification
and additional information.
Assigning Priorities to Contacts
• Priorities for ranking contacts for investigation are set on
the basis of the characteristics of the index patient, the
duration and circumstances of exposure, and the vulner-
ability or susceptibility of the contact to disease progres-
sion from M. tuberculosis infection.
• The optimal exposure cut-off durations for assigning pri-
orities to contacts have not been determined because avail-
able data lack this level of precision. The National
Tuberculosis Controllers Association work group did not
reach consensus on cut-off durations. On the basis of lo-
cal experience and adjusting for resource limitations, pub-
lic health officials should set local standards for the
durations of exposure that define high, medium, and low
priority.
Diagnostic and Public Health
Evaluation of Contacts
General
• Health departments are responsible for ensuring that TB
contacts are medically evaluated and treated.
• Communicable disease regulations or laws in certain
jurisdictions apply to contacts who are not responsive to




• The features of the TB case under investigation inform
decisions about whether to perform a contact investiga-
tion (see Figure 1). An investigation (i.e., seeking and
evaluating contacts) is recommended for the following
forms of suspected or confirmed TB because they are likely
to be infectious: pulmonary, laryngeal, or pleural TB dis-
ease with 1) pulmonary cavities, 2) respiratory specimens
that have acid-fast bacilli (AFB) on microscopy, or 3) both.
• As time and resources permit and as recommended inves-
tigations are completed successfully, other pulmonary TB
cases may be investigated if they are confirmed by culture
of respiratory secretions.
• Pulmonary TB cases without positive mycobacteriology
results should not be investigated unless circumstances
indicate otherwise (e.g., if mycobacteriologic results are
absent because of an error or if a priori information raises
suspicion that contacts have been infected).
• The only forms of purely extrapulmonary TB (i.e., cases
without pulmonary disease) that should be investigated
are laryngeal or pleural disease. For other forms, source-
case investigations can be considered under special cir-
cumstances (see Source-Case Investigations).
Investigating the Index Patient
and Sites of Transmission
• Written policies and procedures for these tasks improve
uniformity and efficiency.
• Tasks should be assigned to trained and experienced pub-
lic health workers.
• Interviews should be in the index patient’s primary lan-
guage and be conducted by persons fluent in that lan-
guage or in conjunction with fluent interpreters.
• The index patient should be interviewed in person (i.e.,
not by telephone) <1 business day after notification for
cases indicating infectiousness and <3 business days for
others. For patients who have died or who are inacces-
sible, alternative sources of information regarding con-
tacts should be sought.
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• Each high- and medium-priority contact should be
assessed initially <3 working days after being listed.
• Each high- and medium-priority contact should be evalu-
ated medically to determine whether TB disease and
latent infection with M. tuberculosis are present or absent.
• The same diagnostic methods are recommended for all
contacts except when they have medical or constitutional
conditions making TB more likely or more difficult to
diagnose. A contact’s country of origin and Bacille
Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccination status are not
included in algorithms for diagnosis or treatment.
Voluntary HIV Counseling, Testing,
and Referral
• Inform all contacts that HIV infection is the greatest
known risk factor for TB disease progressing from
M. tuberculosis infection, and ask whether they have been
tested for HIV infection.
• Offer voluntary HIV counseling, testing, and referral to
TB contacts who do not know their HIV infection sta-
tus. Collaboration with HIV-AIDS programs is recom-
mended for establishing systems that are convenient and
flexible for patients.
• Voluntary HIV counseling, testing, and referral are rec-
ommended for contacts of HIV-infected infectious TB
patients.
Tuberculin Skin Testing
• A tuberculin skin test (TST) is recommended for all con-
tacts who do not have a documented prior positive test
result or documented prior TB disease. The skin test can
be administered at the time of the initial assessment. High-
priority contacts should receive a test <7 days after they
are listed, and medium-priority contacts <14 days.
• A two-step TST as defined for infection control surveil-
lance is not recommended for contact investigations.
Evaluation of Children Aged <5 Years
• Contacts aged <5 years exposed to an infectious index
patient are assigned a high priority.
• Contacts aged <5 years should be medically examined and
have a chest radiograph regardless of the result of the cur-




• HIV-infected or other immunocompromised contacts are
high-priority contacts.
• In addition to a medical history, examination, and a TST,
a chest radiograph is recommended for all these contacts.
Sputum collection for AFB microscopy and culture is rec-
ommended if the contact has symptoms consistent with
TB disease or if the chest radiograph has abnormalities
that could be caused by TB.
Any Contacts Being Evaluated
• Contacts who have a positive TST result (>5 mm) should
be medically examined, including a chest radiograph, to
rule out TB disease. Contacts who have symptoms con-
sistent with TB also should be medically evaluated, in-
cluding a chest radiograph, to rule out TB, regardless of
the results of the skin test, history of a prior positive re-
sult, or history of prior TB disease.
• During the infectious period, those high- and medium-
priority contacts who have a negative skin test result <8
weeks after their most recent exposure should have a sec-
ond skin test 8–10 weeks after that exposure.
• For low-priority contacts, the initial skin test may be
delayed until 8–10 weeks after the most recent exposure if
the contact does not have symptoms suggestive of TB dis-
ease. If the test is administered <8 weeks after the most
recent exposure, the decision to give a second, postexposure
skin test can be made on a case-by-case basis.
Treatment for Contacts
with M. tuberculosis Infection
• Treating contacts who have latent M. tuberculosis infec-
tion through completion is a health department respon-
sibility to prevent communicable diseases.
• High- and medium-priority contacts with positive TSTs
who come from countries with prevalent TB should be
treated, regardless of whether they have had routine BCG
vaccination.
• Treatment for latent infection should be offered to all
contacts who have a positive tuberculin skin test result,
after active TB is excluded. The emphasis of the program
should be on completing treatment in high- and medium-
priority contacts.
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• Window-period prophylaxis (see Diagnostic and Public
Health Evaluation of Contacts) is recommended as an
option for contacts aged <5 years who have a negative
skin test result <8 weeks after the end of exposure, after
TB disease has been excluded. If a second skin test result
8–10 weeks after the end of exposure is negative, treat-
ment can be stopped.
• A full course of treatment for presumptive M. tuberculosis
infection is recommended for HIV-infected or otherwise
notably immune-suppressed contacts, after TB disease has
been excluded, even if skin test results are negative >8
weeks after the end of exposure.
• The decision to treat contacts who have documentation
of a previous positive skin test result or TB disease should
be made on an individual basis. Treatment is recom-
mended for HIV-infected contacts in this category, even
if infection has been treated previously.
• Rifampin treatment is recommended for contacts who,
after TB disease has been excluded, have infection pre-
sumed to be isoniazid (INH)-resistant, rifampin-suscep-
tible M. tuberculosis after exposure to an index patient
with such an isolate.
• Expert consultation is recommended for selecting treat-
ment for a latent infection with presumed INH- and
rifampin-resistant M. tuberculosis. Contacts with such an
infection should be monitored with periodic examina-
tion for at least 2 years.
• Directly observed therapy (DOT) for latent infection is
preferred over self supervised. DOT preference should be
assigned to these groups, in this general order:
— confirmed or suspected TB disease;
— latent M. tuberculosis infection in contacts aged <5 years;
— latent M. tuberculosis infection in contacts who have
HIV infection or other conditions that limit immune
response to TB;
— latent M. tuberculosis infection in contacts with docu-
mented change in tuberculin sensitivity, from a nega-
tive to a positive result; and
— latent M. tuberculosis infection in contacts who might
not complete treatment because of social or behav-
ioral impediments (e.g., alcohol addiction, chronic
mental illness, injection-drug use, unstable housing,
unemployment).
• Monitoring for adherence and adverse effects by home
visits, pill counts, or clinic appointments monthly or more
often is recommended for contacts on self-administered
treatment.
• Use of enablers and incentives and establishment of a
positive rapport with contacts who are taking treatment
are recommended for enhancing adherence.
When to Expand a Contact
Investigation
• Inclusion of lower-priority contacts generally is not rec-
ommended unless objectives for high- and medium-pri-
ority contacts are being met.
• Consider expanding the scope (i.e., number of contacts)
of an investigation if any one or more of the following
criteria exist:
— unexpectedly large rate of infection or TB disease in
high-priority contacts,
— evidence of second-generation transmission,
— TB disease in any contacts who had been assigned low
priority,
— infection in any contacts aged <5 years, and
— contacts with change in skin test status from negative
to positive.
• After reviewing the results from the investigation to date
(i.e., for high- and medium-priority contacts), select the
additional contacts by extrapolating the risks for infec-
tion as shown by the data.
• When results from an investigation indicate that it should
be expanded, but resources are insufficient, seeking assis-




• Anticipatory media communication (e.g., with a press
release) for large or highly visible TB contact investiga-
tions is recommended to capitalize on the opportunity
for constructive public communications.
• Coordination of media communications, both within the
health department and with collaborating partners out-
side the health department, improves the clarity and con-
sistency of media messages.
• For efficiency, use of media message templates for con-
tact investigations is recommended.




• Collection of specific data elements on index patients and
their contacts is recommended. The data elements should
permit calculation of program performance indices.
• Data should be collected on standardized (paper or elec-
tronic) forms.
• Data definitions and formats for use by persons who col-
lect, use, and interpret contact investigation data are rec-
ommended.
• Whenever feasible, data definitions and formats should
be standard among jurisdictions.
• Electronic data storage is recommended for quick analy-
sis of interim results.
• Policies for data management and storage are recom-
mended, with assignment of responsibilities.
• Training and policies for data accuracy, completeness, and
security are recommended. Part of a staff-person’s time
should be dedicated to reviewing and monitoring contact
investigation data.
• Periodic summarization and review of data are recom-
mended during a particular contact investigation and
overall.
• Program evaluation for contact investigation activities, at
least annually, is recommended. It is an integral part of
TB program responsibility.
• Beyond standard data elements shown in these guidelines,




• Specific policies for release of confidential information
related to contact investigations are recommended. These
policies should be consistent with the Privacy Rule of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA) and Sections 306 and 308(d) of the Pub-
lic Health Service Act and be developed in consultation
from health department legal counsel. These policies typi-
cally include instructions for obtaining consents and for
breaking confidentiality when required for public health
as authorized by laws.
• Patient confidentiality is a core element integrated with
all activities in contact investigations, and training in its
laws and practice is recommended for all personnel who
participate.
• Discussion with the index patient and contacts regarding
their confidentiality beliefs and concerns is recommended.
TB control program staff should explain to the index pa-
tient the measures that will be taken to maintain confiden-
tiality.
• Preparations for protecting confidentiality are recom-
mended for each site visit during an investigation. Antici-
patory discussions with any patients who might be affected
contribute to the preparations.
• Confidentiality applies to all private information and
medical conditions in addition to TB.
Staffing and Training
for Contact Investigations
• Certain functions in contact investigations require state
licensure. Delineation of these functions is recommended
for preparing personnel position descriptions.
• Specialized functions and related skills are needed during
contact investigations; they might be provided by sources
outside of the health department (Box 3).
• Preparatory training and detailed on-the-job supervision
as each function is encountered by new health depart-
ment personnel establish the basis for expertise.
• Direct observation by experienced personnel and oppor-
tunities for practicing skills are essential when any per-
sonnel assume new functions for contact investigations.
• Clerical personnel, receptionists, and managers who help
with contact investigations need to understand the over-
all purpose and methods of contact investigations.
• When sources outside the health department serve essen-
tial functions in a contact investigation, the health
department is responsible for assessing whether the skills




• A cluster of TB cases (i.e., a presumed outbreak) indi-
cates potential lapses in TB control which should be
investigated along with the outbreak. Assistance should
be requested if the scope of the investigation exceeds local
capacity or disrupts key activities of TB control.
• When secondary TB cases are discovered unexpectedly
(e.g., outside of a contact investigation), this indicates a
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potential outbreak. Review of the investigative strategy is
recommended.
• When contact investigations include congregate settings,
officials or administrators at the setting should be enlisted
as collaborators. Access to employee and occupancy ros-
ters should be sought.  Sensitivities and needs of the set-
ting and its populace should be accommodated to the
extent permitted by good public health practice.
• When few contacts are listed because information cannot
be obtained from an index TB patient, alternative or proxy
methods, such as interviews in the extended social net-
work, are recommended.
• Contact investigations for multidrug-resistant TB do not
require a change in procedures, but the reasons for the
drug resistance should be explored.
• Interjurisdictional contact investigations should be
planned collaboratively from the inception. Assistance in
coordinating such investigation should be sought from
the next higher public-health administrative level.
• Unusual exposures to M. tuberculosis-complex, such as
laboratory accidents or tuberculous animals, should be
investigated on site, and contacts should be selected in
accordance with the event, in consultation with subject-
matter experts.
Source-Case Investigations
• Source-case investigations are not recommended unless
investigations of infectious cases have been successfully
completed and program objectives for investigating con-
tagious patients and treating their infected contacts are
being met.
• Source-case investigations, if conducted, are recommended
for TB disease in children aged <5 years.
• Data on source-case investigations should be reviewed for
determining the value of these investigations in the local
context.
• Searching for a source of unexplained latent M. tuberculosis
infection is not recommended, and if conducted, should
be reserved for infected children aged <2 years.
Other Topics
Cultural Competency
• Systems for providing culturally and linguistically accept-
able care during contact investigations are recommended.
• Training in cultural and linguistic sensitivity is recom-
mended for personnel who conduct contact investigations.
Social Network Analysis
• The methods of social network analysis are recommended
for further research. However, certain concepts (e.g., set-
ting-based investigations) are also applicable to current
efforts.
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Goal and Objectives
 This report provides expanded guidelines concerning the investigation of tuberculosis (TB) exposure and transmission and prevention of future cases of TB through
contact investigations. The goal of this report is to provide standard and comprehensive guidance for this public health activity that will lead to improved outcomes
for persons exposed to infectious TB. Upon completion of this educational activity, the reader should be able to 1) discuss when to initiate a contact investigation;
2) discuss how to prioritize the evaluation of contacts; 3) discuss the diagnostic evaluation of contacts, including children aged <5 years old and immunocompromised
contacts; 4) discuss the medical treatment of contacts who have latent tuberculosis infection [LTBI]; and 5) discuss when to expand a contact investigation.
To receive continuing education credit, please answer all of the following questions.
9. I plan to use these recommendations as the basis for…(Indicate all
that apply.)
A. health education materials.
B. insurance reimbursement policies.
C. local practice guidelines.
D. public policy.
E. other.
10. Overall, the length of the journal report was…
A. much too long.
B. a little too long.
C. just right.
D. a little too short.
E. much too short.







12. After reading this report, I am confident I can discuss how to prioritize






13. After reading this report, I am confident I can discuss the diagnostic







14. After reading this report, I am confident I can discuss the medical






1. What factors predict transmission of TB?
A. Anatomical site of disease.
B. Sputum bacteriology.
C. Radiographic findings.
D. Administration of effective treatment.
E. All of the above.




3. The most important characteristics of contacts for assigning priority
are age and immune status.
A. True.
B. False.
4. Two-step tuberculin skin tests (TSTs) are recommended for the
evaluation of foreign-born contacts.
A. True.
B. False.
5. Contacts with TST reactions >5 mm should undergo further medical
evaluation, including a chest radiograph.
A. True.
B. False.
6. Which contacts should be considered for window prophylaxis?
A. Children aged <5 years.
B. Healthy adults
C. Contacts who are immunocompromised.
D. College students.
E. All of the above.
F. A and B.
G. A and C.
7. Source-case investigations are recommended for adults with TB disease.
A. True.
B. False.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17. The instructional strategies (text, tables, boxes, figures, and appendices)







































CE-4 MMWR December 16, 2005
Correct answers for questions 1–7.
1. E; 2. T; 3. T; 4. F; 5. T; 6. G; 7. F.
22. The availability of continuing education credit influenced my












24. Do you feel this course was commercially biased? (Indicate yes or no;
if yes, please explain in the space provided.)
A. Yes.
B. No.
25. How did you learn about the continuing education activity?
A. Internet.
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Guidelines for Using the QuantiFERON®-TB Gold
Test for Detecting Mycobacterium tuberculosis
Infection, United States
Prepared by
Gerald H. Mazurek, MD, John Jereb, MD, Phillip LoBue, MD, Michael F. Iademarco, MD, Beverly Metchock, PhD, Andrew Vernon, MD
Division of Tuberculosis Elimination, National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention
Summary
On May 2, 2005, a new in vitro test, QuantiFERON®-TB Gold (QFT-G, Cellestis Limited, Carnegie, Victoria, Australia),
received final approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration as an aid for diagnosing Mycobacterium tuberculosis
infection. This test detects the release of interferon-gamma (IFN-γ) in fresh heparinized whole blood from sensitized persons when
it is incubated with mixtures of synthetic peptides representing two proteins present in M. tuberculosis: early secretory antigenic
target–6 (ESAT-6) and culture filtrate protein–10 (CFP-10). These antigens impart greater specificity than is possible with tests
using purified protein derivative as the tuberculosis (TB) antigen. In direct comparisons, the sensitivity of QFT-G was statistically
similar to that of the tuberculin skin test (TST) for detecting infection in persons with untreated culture-confirmed tuberculosis
(TB). The performance of QFT-G in certain populations targeted by TB control programs in the United States for finding latent
TB infection is under study. Its ability to predict who eventually will have TB disease has not been determined, and years of
observational study of substantial populations would be needed to acquire this information. In July 2005, CDC convened a
meeting of consultants and researchers with expertise in the field to review scientific evidence and clinical experience with
QFT-G. On the basis of this review and discussion, CDC recommends that QFT-G may be used in all circumstances in which the
TST is currently used, including contact investigations, evaluation of recent immigrants, and sequential-testing surveillance
programs for infection control (e.g., those for health-care workers). This report provides specific cautions for interpreting negative
QFT-G results in persons from selected populations. This report is aimed at public health officials, health-care providers, and
laboratory workers with responsibility for TB control activities in the United States.
(CFP-10). ESAT-6 and CFP-10 are secreted by all M. tuberculosis
and pathogenic M. bovis strains. Because these proteins are
absent from all Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccine strains
and from commonly encountered nontuberculous mycobac-
teria (NTM) except M. kansasii, M. szulgai, and M. marinum
(1), QFT-G is expected to be more specific for M. tuberculosis
than tests that use tuberculin purified protein derivative (PPD)
as the antigen.
QFT-G represents one type of IFN-γ release assay (IGRA)
(2). Tests such as QFT-G measure the IFN-γ released by sensi-
tized white blood cells after whole blood is incubated with
antigen. Tests such as ELISpot enumerate cells releasing IFN-γ
after mononuclear cells recovered from whole blood are incu-
bated with similar antigens. Two IGRAs have been approved
by FDA for use in the United States: the original
QuantiFERON®-TB test (QFT) and the recently approved
QFT-G. The two tests use different antigens to stimulate IFN-γ
release, different methods of measurement, and different
approaches to test interpretation. QFT was approved as an aid
for diagnosing LTBI, whereas QFT-G is approved as an aid for
diagnosing both LTBI and TB disease. QFT is no longer com-
mercially available.
Background
On May 2, 2005, a new in vitro test, QuantiFERON®-TB
Gold (QFT-G, manufactured by Cellestis Limited, Carnegie,
Victoria, Australia), received final approval from the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) as an aid in diagnosing
Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection, including both latent
tuberculosis infection (LTBI) and tuberculosis (TB) disease.
This enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) test
detects the release of interferon-gamma (IFN-γ) in fresh hep-
arinized whole blood from sensitized persons when it is incu-
bated with mixtures of synthetic peptides simulating two
proteins present in M. tuberculosis: early secretory
antigenic target–6 (ESAT-6) and culture filtrate protein–10
The material in this report originated in the National Center for HIV,
STD, and TB Prevention, Kevin Fenton, MD, PhD, Director, and the
Division of Tuberculosis Elimination, Kenneth G. Castro, MD, Director.
Corresponding address: CDC/National Center for HIV, STD, and
TB Prevention/Division of Tuberculosis Elimination; 1600 Clifton
Road, NE, MS E-10, Atlanta, GA 30333. Telephone: 404-639-8120;
Fax: 404-639-8604; E-mail: mai9@cdc.gov.
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Before QFT was approved in 2001, the tuberculin skin test
(TST) was the only test available for detecting LTBI (3). QFT-G
is intended to replace QFT. QFT-G results can be available <24
hours after testing without the need for a second visit, whereas
a TST requires a second encounter to read the result 48–72
hours after administration of the test. As a laboratory-based
assay, QFT-G is not subject to biases and errors of TST place-
ment and reading. However, errors in collecting or transport-
ing blood specimens or in running and interpreting the assay
can decrease the accuracy of QFT-G. Related to the uncertainty
in interpreting a test result, including that of the TST, when the
test’s measurement approaches a fixed cut-off point, the repro-
ducibility of QFT-G is less when the measured amount of IFN-γ
is near the test’s cut-off point. Detection of substantial amounts
of released IFN-γ in the nil sample disallows arriving at a nega-
tive test result.
Each of the three tests (TST, QFT, and QFT-G) relies on a
different immune response and differs in its relative measures
of sensitivity and specificity. The TST assesses in vivo delayed-
type hypersensitivity (Type IV), whereas QFT and QFT-G
measure in vitro release of IFN-γ. The TST and QFT mea-
sure response to PPD, a polyvalent antigenic mixture, whereas
QFT-G measures response to a mixture of synthetic peptides
simulating two specific antigenic proteins that are present in
PPD. The agreement between TST and QFT results in per-
sons at increased risk for LTBI facilitated approval and accep-
tance of QFT (3,4). Results of similar studies using QFT-G
testing for persons at increased risk have not been published,
but less agreement between TST and QFT-G results is pre-
dictable because fewer and more specific antigens are used in
QFT-G. QFT-G is not affected by prior BCG vaccination (1)
and is expected to be less influenced by previous infection
with nontuberculous mycobacteria (5). TSTs are variably
affected by these factors. QFT-G does not trigger an anam-
nestic response (i.e., boosting) because it does not expose per-
sons to antigen. Injection of PPD for the TST can boost
subsequent TST responses, primarily in persons who have been
infected with NTM or vaccinated with BCG. Compared with
the TST, QFT-G might be less affected by boosting from a
previous TST.
Assessment of the accuracy of QFT-G and other indirect tests
for M. tuberculosis infection (including TSTs) is hampered by
the lack of confirmatory tests to diagnose LTBI and culture-
negative TB disease (6). This lack is partially addressed by
observing the proportion of negative tests among persons who
are unlikely to have M. tuberculosis infection because they lack
risks (this approach approximates specificity); by observing the
proportion positive among persons with culture-confirmed TB
disease (this approach approximates sensitivity); and by deter-
mining factors associated with discordance between a new test
and the TST. One limitation of the first approach is that cer-
tain persons who have no recognized risks might be infected
with M. tuberculosis, which causes specificity to be underesti-
mated. A broad limitation is that the TST and any newer tests
might not perform the same for detecting LTBI as they do for
detecting M. tuberculosis infection during TB disease. For
example, reduction of in vitro IFN-γ release has been attrib-
uted to suppressive cytokines associated with TB disease (7).
When comparing an IGRA with a TST, variations in methods
also must be considered (e.g., use of different antigens or risk-
stratified cut-off points for interpreting results).
Studies assessing QFT-G with these approximation meth-
ods have been published (5,8,9). A specificity of 98.1% was
reported in 216 BCG-vaccinated Japanese nursing students
who were entering their training and who were at low risk for
M. tuberculosis infection, and a sensitivity of 89.0% was
reported in 118 patients with culture-confirmed TB (5). How-
ever, QFT-G results were derived slightly differently than the
methods approved by FDA. In another study (8), QFT-G was
compared with TST by using two tuberculin units of RT-23
(8,10). In a group of 99 healthy, BCG-vaccinated medical
students in Korea, the specificity of QFT-G was 96%, com-
pared with 49% for the TST. Among 54 patients with pul-
monary TB disease, the sensitivity of the QFT-G was 81%,
compared with 78% for  the TST (8). QFT-G and the TST
were compared in an unselected population of 318 hospital-
ized patients (9). QFT-G had greater sensitivity for TB dis-
ease (67%) than did TST (33%), but indeterminate QFT-G
responses were common (21%) among patients with negative
TST results, the majority of whom were thought to be
immunocompromised or immunosuppressed.
The antigens or laboratory methods in other studies have
varied (2). Although the findings are informative, how QFT-G
will perform in the same circumstances is unknown. In an
investigation of contacts in a high school in Denmark in which
a student had infectious TB, the same ELISA used with QFT-G
was employed, but with recombinant ESAT-6 and CFP-10
antigens used rather than the mixtures of synthetic peptides
used with QFT-G (11). The IGRA used in that study agreed
well with the TST in non-BCG–vaccinated contacts. BCG-
vaccinated contacts were not skin tested, but their IGRA
results closely paralleled those for the nonvaccinated contacts,
which suggested that BCG vaccination was not affecting the
results of this IGRA.
Methodology
During July 11–12, 2005, CDC convened a meeting in
Atlanta, Georgia, of consultants and researchers with exper-
tise in the field to review studies and assess experience with
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QFT-G. Unpublished data from studies of QFT-G were con-
sidered in preparing these guidelines. Expert consultants (see
Membership List), researchers, TB control public health prac-
titioners, and representatives of FDA, other federal agencies,
and the manufacturer reviewed the evolving data on QFT-G.
Data from ongoing studies evaluating QFT-G in U.S. Navy
recruits, correctional facility inmates, persons with suspected
TB disease, contacts of persons suspected to have TB disease,
and health care workers were reviewed. For developing these
guidelines, CDC considered the scientific evidence and the
opinions of the consultants. Their opinions did not repre-
sent endorsement from their organizations.
This report provides interim guidance for use and interpre-
tation of QFT-G. Confirming or excluding TB disease and
assessing the probability of LTBI require a combination of
epidemiologic, historic, physical, and diagnostic findings that
should be considered when interpreting QFT-G results. This
report is intended to assist public health officials, clinicians,
and laboratorians in their efforts to understand the use of
QFT-G for TB control.
Indications for QFT-G
FDA approved QFT-G as an in vitro diagnostic aid using
peptide mixtures simulating ESAT-6 and CFP-10 proteins to
stimulate cells in heparinized whole blood. Detection of IFN-γ
by ELISA is used to identify in vitro responses to ESAT-6 and
CFP-10 that are associated with M. tuberculosis infection (12).
From a medical and public health perspective, QFT-G testing
is indicated for diagnosing infection with M. tuberculosis,
including both TB disease and LTBI. Whenever M. tubercu-
losis infection or disease is being diagnosed by any method,
the optimal approach includes coordination with the local or
regional public health TB control program.
How QFT-G Testing is Performed
and Interpreted
Instructions for the QFT-G assay are in the package insert
(13). Aliquots of heparinized whole blood are incubated with
the test antigens for 16–24 hours. The blood must be incu-
bated with the test antigens <12 hours after collection. Test
kits include two mixtures of synthetic peptides representing
ESAT-6 and CFP-10 as test antigens, phytohemaglutinin
(a mitogen used as a positive assay control), and saline (used
as a nil sample to measure the background level of IFN-γ).
After incubation, the concentration of IFN-γ in the plasma is
determined by ELISA by using the reagents included in the
test kit. The amount of IFN-γ released is determined by sub-
tracting the amount in the nil from the amount in the ESAT-6,
CFP-10, or mitogen-stimulated plasma. QFT-G test results
can be calculated by using software provided by the manufac-
turer. This report provides guidelines for interpreting test
results (Table). Laboratory reports should include interpreta-
tion of QFT-G test results and indicate the concentration of
IFN-γ in each plasma sample.
Cautions and Limitations
Certain limitations of QFT-G are similar to those of the
TST, but these limitations have not been studied extensively
for QFT-G. Whereas the sensitivity of QFT-G for detecting
M. tuberculosis infection in persons with untreated culture-
TABLE. Interpretation of QFT-G* results, from IFN-γ† concentrations in test samples
ESAT-6–nil§ or CFP-10–nil¶ or both Nil Mitogen–nil** QFT-G result Interpretation
>0.35 IU/mL†† and >50% above nil Any Any Positive Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection likely
<0.35 IU/mL <0.7 >0.5 Negative M. tuberculosis infection unlikely but cannot be excluded,
especially when illness is consistent with TB§§ disease and
likelihood of progression to TB disease is increased
<0.35 IU/mL Any <0.5 Indeterminate QFT-G results cannot be interpreted as a result of low mitogen
response
<50% above nil >0.7 Any Indeterminate QFT-G results cannot be interpreted as a result of high
background response
* QuantiFERON®-TB Gold test.
† Interferon-gama.
§ The IFN-γ concentration in blood incubated with a mixture of synthetic peptides simulating early secretory antigenic target–6 (ESAT-6) minus the IFN-γ
concentration in blood incubated with saline.
¶ The IFN-γ concentration in blood incubated with a mixture of synthetic peptides simulating culture filtrate protein–10 (CFP-10) minus the IFN-γ concentra-
tion in blood incubated with saline.
** IFN-γ concentration in blood incubated with mitogen minus the IFN-γ concentration in blood incubated with saline.
†† International units per mL.
§§ Tuberculosis.
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confirmed TB is approximately 80% in published studies (5,8),
its sensitivity for particular groups of TB patients (e.g., young
children and immunocompromised patients) has not been
determined.
QFT-G sensitivity for LTBI might be less than that of the
TST, although the lack a confirmatory test makes this diffi-
cult to assess. Estimating the sensitivity of any indirect test for
LTBI by testing patients who have TB disease might be inac-
curate because of differences between these conditions. The
ability of QFT-G to predict risk for LTBI progressing subse-
quently to TB disease has not been determined.
QFT-G, as with the TST, cannot differentiate infection
associated with TB disease from LTBI. A diagnosis of LTBI
requires that TB disease be excluded by medical evaluation,
which should include checking for suggestive symptoms and
signs, a chest radiograph, and, when indicated, examination
of sputum or other clinical samples for the presence of
M. tuberculosis.
Similar to any other diagnostic test, the predictive value of
QFT-G results depends on the prevalence of M. tuberculosis
infection in the population being tested. Each QFT-G result
and its interpretation should be considered in conjunction with
other epidemiologic, historic, physical, and diagnostic findings.
As with a negative TST result, negative QFT-G results should
not be used alone to exclude M. tuberculosis infection in per-
sons with symptoms or signs suggestive of TB disease. The pres-
ence of symptoms or signs suggestive of TB disease increases the
likelihood that M. tuberculosis infection is present, and these
circumstances decrease the predictive value of a negative QFT-G
or TST result. Medical evaluation of such persons should
include a history and physical examination, chest radiograph,
bacteriologic studies, serology for human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV), and, when indicated, other tests or studies.
The performance of QFT-G, in particular its sensitivity and
its rate of indeterminate results, has not been determined in
persons who, because of impaired immune function, are at
increased risk for M. tuberculosis infection progressing to TB
disease. Impaired immune function can be caused by HIV
infection or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS); cur-
rent treatment with immunosuppressive drugs including high-
dose corticosteroids, tumor necrosis factor-alpha (TNF-α)
antagonists, and drugs used for managing organ transplanta-
tion; selected hematologic disorders (e.g., myeloproliferative dis-
orders, leukemias, and lymphomas); specific malignancies (e.g.,
carcinoma of the head, neck, or lung); diabetes; silicosis; and
chronic renal failure (6). Each of these conditions or treatments
is known or suspected to decrease responsiveness to the TST,
and they also might decrease production of IFN-γ in the QFT-
G assay. Consequently, as with a negative TST result, negative
QFT-G results alone might not be sufficient to exclude
M. tuberculosis infection in these persons.
Published data are relatively limited concerning the use of
QFT-G among persons recently exposed to TB (e.g., contacts)
and other populations at high risk for LTBI. No published data
document the performance of QFT-G in children aged <17 years.
With any of the testing methods, persons who have a nega-
tive test result can still have LTBI. Those who have a negative
result but who are likely to have LTBI and who are at greater
risk for severe illness or poor outcomes if TB disease occurs
might need treatment or closer monitoring for disease (6).
Potential examples include close contacts who are aged <5
years, those who are immunocompromised because of HIV
infection, or those who will undergo treatment with TNF-α
antagonists (which increase the risk for progression from LTBI
to TB disease) (14–16).
QFT-G has practical limitations that include the need to draw
blood and to ensure its receipt in a qualified laboratory in time
for testing. The blood must be incubated with the test antigens
<12 hours after collection, while the lymphocytes are viable.
After the blood is incubated with antigens for 16–24 hours,
plasma must be collected and either properly stored or tested
promptly by ELISA. Collecting the required 5-mL blood sample
from younger children might not be possible or acceptable.
Additional Considerations and
Recommendations in the Use of
QFT-G in Testing Programs
QFT-G can be used in all circumstances in which the TST
is used, including contact investigations, evaluation of recent
immigrants who have had BCG vaccination, and TB screen-
ing of health-care workers and others undergoing serial evalu-
ation for M. tuberculosis infection. QFT-G usually can be used
in place of (and not in addition to) the TST.
A positive QFT-G result should prompt the same public
health and medical interventions as a positive TST result. No
reason exists to follow a positive QFT-G result with a TST.
Persons who have a positive QFT-G result, regardless of symp-
toms or signs, should be evaluated for TB disease before LTBI
is diagnosed. At a minimum, a chest radiograph should be
examined for abnormalities consistent with TB disease. Addi-
tional medical evaluation would depend on clinical judgment
on the basis of findings from history (including exposure to
infectious TB), physical examination, and chest radiography.
HIV counseling, testing, and referral is recommended because
HIV infection increases the suspicion for TB and the urgency
of treating LTBI. After TB has been excluded, treatment of
LTBI should be considered (6).
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The majority of healthy adults who have negative QFT-G
results are unlikely to have M. tuberculosis infection and do
not require further evaluation. However, for persons with
recent contact with persons who have infectious TB, negative
QFT-G results should be confirmed with a repeat test per-
formed 8–10 weeks after the end of exposure, as is recom-
mended for a negative TST result. Studies to determine the
best time to retest contacts with negative QFT-G results have
not been reported. Until more information is available, the
timing of QFT-G testing should be the same as that used for
the TST (17,18).
When “window period” prophylaxis (i.e., treatment for pre-
sumed LTBI) is indicated for contacts aged <5 years or
severely immunocompromised persons who are exposed to
highly contagious TB, repeat testing for LTBI is recommended
8–10 weeks after contact has ended (18). With either TST or
QFT-G, negative results of the test at the end of the window
period should be interpreted by considering all available epi-
demiologic, historic, clinical, physical, and diagnostic infor-
mation, including the findings for the other contacts in the
investigation. A full course of treatment should be considered
even with a negative result from either test at the end of the
window period when the rate of M. tuberculosis transmission
to other contacts was high or when a false-negative result is
suspected because of a medical condition (18).
A greater rate of positive results has been reported with TST
than with QFT-G in persons with and without recognized
risks for M. tuberculosis infection, except for patients who have
culture-confirmed TB disease (5,8). This tendency might be
explained by either greater specificity with QFT-G, greater
sensitivity with TST, or both. For this reason, all information
must be considered when making treatment decisions for per-
sons with increased risk for progression from LTBI to TB or
in whom TB disease is associated with increased risk for
severe illness or poor outcomes.
An indeterminate QFT-G result does not provide useful
information regarding the likelihood of M. tuberculosis infec-
tion. The optimal follow-up of persons with indeterminate
QFT-G results has not been determined. The options are to
repeat QFT-G with a newly obtained blood specimen,
administer a TST, or do neither. For persons with an increased
likelihood of M. tuberculosis infection who have an indeter-
minate QFT-G result, administration of a second test, either
QFT-G or TST, might be prudent. The potential for TST to
cause boosting and the need for two-step testing in settings
conducting serial testing should be considered. For persons
who are unlikely to have M. tuberculosis infection, no further
tests are necessary after an indeterminate QFT-G result. Labo-
ratories should report the reason that the QFT-G result was
indeterminate (e.g., high background levels of IFN-γ in the
nil sample or inadequate response to mitogen). In one report,
inadequate response to mitogen was associated with immu-
nosuppressive conditions (9).
As with the TST, if TB disease is suspected, additional diag-
nostic evaluations should be performed before or at the same
time as the QFT-G and should not be delayed while awaiting
QFT-G results. These evaluations should include chest radi-
ography, bacteriologic studies, serology for HIV, and, as indi-
cated by the illness, additional tests and studies. At present, as
with the TST, the results of indirect tests for M. tuberculosis
(e.g., QFT-G) usually would not influence the selection of
additional tests and studies in such patients.
TB control programs can use QFT-G for investigating con-
tacts of persons with potentially infectious TB disease.
Because QFT-G does not require a second visit to complete,
test results probably will be available from a greater percent-
age of contacts than would be available using TST. Because of
its greater specificity, QFT-G is expected to indicate a smaller
proportion of contacts as infected than the TST would indi-
cate. Public health resources that previously were devoted to
completion of testing can instead be concentrated on full evalu-
ation and complete treatment of contacts who have positive
QFT-G results. In contrast to the TST, initial QFT-G testing
of contacts will not boost subsequent test results, which avoids
uncertainty about interpreting follow-up results. However,
QFT-G might be less sensitive for LTBI than the TST, and its
ability to predict subsequent development of TB disease is
undetermined.
QFT-G might represent a cost-effective alternative to the
TST in testing programs which are part of the TB infection
control program in institutions such as health care settings,
correctional facilities, or homeless shelters. In these settings,
false-positive reactions to the TST pose a problem. This prob-
lem is compounded in settings with BCG-vaccinated persons
born in countries where TB is prevalent. Follow-up visits for
reading the TST also pose substantial operational challenges;
the second visit for reading requires extra effort and leads to
inefficiency. The greater specificity of the QFT-G and the
requirement for only one visit are compelling advantages. Gen-
eral recommendations on the use of QFT-G as part of the
infection control program in health-care settings have been
included in the most recent revision of the TB infection con-
trol guidelines (19). In situations with serial testing for
M. tuberculosis infection, initial two-step testing, which is nec-
essary with the TST, is unnecessary with QFT-G and is not
recommended.
TB control programs or institutions that elect to use QFT-G
should consult and collaborate with laboratories in their sys-
tem to ensure that specimens are properly obtained, handled,
and processed prior to and after arrival in the laboratory.
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Information concerning the assay is in the package insert (13).
Training of laboratory staff will be necessary. Certain facilities
might elect to refer specimens for testing. The Clinical Labo-
ratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) regulations for
quality systems of all phases of the total testing process (pre-
analytic, analytic, and post-analytic) and for general labora-
tory systems must be followed, including, but not limited to,
the requirements for test system, equipment, instruments,
reagents, materials and supplies (42 CFR Part 493.1252), and
the establishment or verification of performance specifications
(42 CFR Part 493.1253) (20). In addition, under CLIA, docu-
mentation of all quality systems, including laboratory profi-
ciency and staff competency, is required.
Future Research Needs
Additional studies to assess the performance of the QFT-G
test under program conditions should be conducted. Further
research is needed regarding use of QFT-G in multiple clini-
cal circumstances. Studies of test performance should assess
specificity, sensitivity, reproducibility, and association of test
results with risk for infection and risk for progressing to TB
disease. Comparisons among different IGRAs and TSTs are
encouraged. Questions to be addressed include the following:
• performance of QFT-G in young children, especially those
aged <5 years;
• performance of QFT-G in persons with impaired immune
systems, including persons with HIV/AIDS, those who
will be treated with TNF-α antagonists, and others;
• performance and practicality of use of QFT-G in substan-
tial numbers of persons who undergo periodic screening;
• determination of the subsequent incidence of TB disease
after LTBI has been either diagnosed or excluded with
QFT-G;
• length of time between exposure, establishment of infec-
tion, and emergence of a positive QFT-G test result;
• economic evaluation and decision analysis comparing
QFT-G with TST;
• changes in QFT-G results during therapy for both LTBI
and TB disease;
• ability of QFT-G to detect reinfection after treatment for
both LTBI and TB disease; and
• performance of QFT-G in targeted testing programs (e.g.,
for recent immigrants from high-incidence countries) and
contact investigations.
In collaboration with FDA and the manufacturer, CDC will
establish mechanisms for postmarketing surveillance. Provid-
ers should use FDA’s MedWatch (available at http://www.
accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/medwatch) to report instances of a
contact having all of the following criteria:
• a negative QFT-G or TST result >6 weeks after the end of
exposure,
• culture-confirmed TB disease <2 years after the end of
exposure, and
• an M. tuberculosis isolate that has a genotype identical to
that of the presumed source case.
Certain instances consistent with these criteria might
require further study of the circumstances. However, reliance
on postmarketing surveillance is not a substitute for research
targeted at the above-noted questions. Research in these areas
and others should therefore be conducted through prospec-
tive studies.
The optimal methods for ensuring quality in laboratory
implementation of QFT-G testing should be determined.
Educational materials are needed that can be widely dissemi-
nated to educate physicians regarding the use of the QFT-G
assay. CDC will work with partners and the manufacturer to
ensure the development of such materials.
Other IGRA tests and test formats might become available
in the United States over the next several years (21,22). Users
of any of these products should anticipate the need for peri-
odic modifications in practice, with resulting improvements
in utility of these testing technologies.
Acknowledgments
The following persons and groups provided vital assistance in the
preparation of this report: Sandra Monique Arend, MD, PhD, Leiden
University Medical Center, Leiden, The Netherlands; Antonino
Catanzaro, MD, University of California San Diego and Cellestis,
San Diego, California; Raymond Chinn, MD, Hospital Infection
Control Professional Advisory Committee representative to the
Advisory Committee for the Elimination of Tuberculosis, Atlanta,
Georgia; Charles L. Daley, MD, Michael D. Iseman, MD, National
Jewish Medical and Research Center, Denver, Colorado; Kimberly
Field, MSN, Washington State Department of Health, Tumwater,
Washington and the National Tuberculosis Controllers Association;
Nobuyuki Harada, PhD, Kazue Higuchi, PhD, Research Institute of
Tuberculosis, Japan Anti-Tuberculosis Association, Tokyo, Japan; C.
Robert Horsburg, MD, Boston University School of Public Health,
Boston, Massachusetts; Madhukar Pai, MD, PhD, University of
California, Berkeley and San Francisco, California; Luca Richeldi,
MD, PhD, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Modena, Italy;
Jason E. Stout, MD, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina;
Michael Tapper, MD, Lenox Hill Hospital, New York, New York;
Paul Vinton, MBBS, Royal Melbourne Hospital and Monash Medical
Centre, Melbourne, Australia; David Warshauer, PhD, Association
of Public Health Laboratories, Washington, District of Columbia;
Tony Radford, PhD, James Rothel, PhD, Mark Boyle, Cellestis
Limited, Carnegie, Australia; Steve M. Ostroff, MD, Department of
Health and Human Services, Honolulu, Hawaii; In vitro Diagnostic
Device Evaluation and Safety, Center for Devices and Radiological
Health, Food and Drug Administration, Washington, District of
Vol. 54 / RR-15 Recommendations and Reports 55
Columbia; Adelisa L. Panlilio, MD, Division of Health Care Quality
Promotion, National Center for Infectious Diseases; David N.
Weisman, MD, Division of Respiratory Disease Studies, National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; Division of Laboratory
Systems, National Center for Health Marketing; Terrence L. Chorba,
MD, Ronald O. Valdiserri, MD, National Center for HIV, STD,
and TB Elimination; Division of Tuberculosis Elimination, National
Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention, CDC, Atlanta, Georgia.
References
1. Andersen P, Munk ME, Pollock JM, Doherty, TM. Specific immune-
based diagnosis of tuberculosis. Lancet 2000;356:1099–104.
2. Pai M, Riley LW, Colford JM Jr. Interferon-γ assays in the
immunodiagnosis of tuberculosis: a systematic review. Lancet Infect
Dis 2004;4:761–76.
3. CDC. Guidelines for using the QuantiFERON®-TB test for diagnos-
ing latent Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection. MMWR 2003;52
(No. RR-2):15–8.
4. Mazurek GH, LoBue PA, Daley CL, et al. Comparison of a whole-
blood interferon γ assay with tuberculin skin testing for detecting
latent Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection. JAMA 2001;286:1740–7.
5. Mori T, Sakatani M, Yamagishi F, et al. Specific detection of tubercu-
losis infection: an interferon-γ–based assay using new antigens. Am J
Respir Crit Care Med 2004;170:59–64.
6. CDC. Targeted tuberculin testing and treatment of latent tuberculosis
infection. MMWR 2000;49(No. RR-6):1–54.
7. Hirsch CS, Toossi Z, Othieno C, et al. Depressed T-cell interferon-γ
responses in pulmonary tuberculosis: analysis of underlying mecha-
nisms and modulation with therapy. J Infect Dis 1999;180:2069–73.
8. Kang YA, Lee HW, Yoon HI, et al. Discrepancy between the tubercu-
lin skin test and the whole-blood interferon γ assay for the diagnosis of
latent tuberculosis infection in an intermediate tuberculosis-burden
country. JAMA 2005;293:2756–61.
9. Ferrara G, Losi M, Meacci M, et al. Routine hospital use of a commer-
cial whole blood interferon-γ assay for tuberculosis infection. Am J
Respir Crit Care Med 2005;172:631–5.
10. Comstock GV, Edwards LB, Philip RN, Winn WA. A comparison in
the United States of America of two tuberculins, PPD-S and RT 23.
Bull World Health Organ 1964;31:161–70.
11. Brock I, Weldingh K, Lillebaek T, Follmann F, Andersen P. Compari-
son of tuberculin skin test and new specific blood test in tuberculosis
contacts. Am J Respir Crit Care Med 2004;170:65–9.
12. Food and Drug Administration. PMA final decisions rendered for
December 2004. Washington, DC: Food and Drug Administration;
2004. Available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/pma/pmadec04.html.
13. Cellestis. QuantiFERON®-TB Gold package insert. Available at http://
www.cellestis.com/IRM/contentAU/gold/Gold_PackageInsert.pdf.
14. American Thoracic Society, CDC, and Infectious Diseases Society of
America. Treatment of tuberculosis, MMWR 2003;52(No. RR-11):1–74.
15. Rigaud M, Borkowsky W. Tuberculosis in children. In: Rom WN, Garay
SM, Bloom BR, eds. Tuberculosis. 2nd ed. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott
Williams and Wilkins; 2004:609–24.
16. CDC. Tuberculosis associated with blocking agents against tumor
necrosis factor-alpha—California, 2002–2003. MMWR 2004;53:683–6.
17. Menzies D. Interpretation of repeated tuberculin tests: boosting, con-
version, and reversion. Am J Respir Crit Care Med 1999;159:15–21.
18. CDC. Guidelines for the investigation of contacts of persons with
infectious tuberculosis: recommendations from the National Tubercu-
losis Controllers Association and CDC. MMWR 2005;54(No.
RR-17):1–47.
19. CDC. Guidelines for preventing the transmission of Mycobacterium
tuberculosis in health-care settings, 2005. MMWR 2005;54(in press).
20. US Health Care Financing Administration. Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments: current CLIA regulations. Available at
http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/clia/regs/toc.aspx.
21. Pai M, Gokhale K, Joshi R, et al. Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection in
health care workers in rural India: comparison of a whole-blood inter-
feron γ assay with tuberculin skin testing. JAMA 2005;293:2746–55.
22. Ewer K, Deeks J, Alvarez L, et al. Comparison of T-cell-based assay with
tuberculin skin test for diagnosis of Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection
in a school tuberculosis outbreak. Lancet 2003;361:1168–73.
CDC Expert Consultation on QuantiFERON®-TB Gold
Membership List, July 11–12, 2005
Chair: Neil Schluger, MD, Columbia University, New York City, New York.
Members: John Bernardo, MD, Boston University School of Medicine, Boston, Massachusetts; Henry Blumberg, MD, PhD, Emory University School of
Medicine, Atlanta, Georgia; Nancy Warren, PhD, Association of Public Health Laboratories, Washington, DC; Masae Kawamura, MD, San Francisco
Department of Public Health, San Francisco, California; David Lewinsohn, MD, PhD, Oregon Health and Science University, Portland, Oregon; Edward
Nardell, MD, Harvard School of Public Health, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Tanya Oemig, National Tuberculosis Controllers’ Association, Smyrna, Georgia;
Randall Reves, MD, Denver Public Health Department, Denver, Colorado; Stephen Kralovic, MD, Veterans Administration, Cincinnati, Ohio; Rachel
Stricof, MPH, Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, Albany, New York; Gail Woods, MD, University of Arkansas for
Medical Sciences, Little Rock, Arkansas.
MMWR
The Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) Series is prepared by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and is available free of charge
in electronic format and on a paid subscription basis for paper copy. To receive an electronic copy each week, send an e-mail message to listserv@listserv.cdc.gov. The
body content should read SUBscribe mmwr-toc. Electronic copy also is available from CDC’s World-Wide Web server at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr or from CDC’s
file transfer protocol server at ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/publications/mmwr. To subscribe for paper copy, contact Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402; telephone 202-512-1800.
Data in the weekly MMWR are provisional, based on weekly reports to CDC by state health departments. The reporting week concludes at close of business on
Friday; compiled data on a national basis are officially released to the public on the following Friday. Address inquiries about the MMWR Series, including material
to be considered for publication, to Editor, MMWR Series, Mailstop K-95, CDC, 1600 Clifton Rd., N.E., Atlanta, GA 30333; telephone 888-232-3228.
All material in the MMWR Series is in the public domain and may be used and reprinted without permission; citation as to source, however, is appreciated.
All MMWR references are available on the Internet at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr. Use the search function to find specific articles.
Use of trade names and commercial sources is for identification only and does not imply endorsement by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
References to non-CDC sites on the Internet are provided as a service to MMWR readers and do not constitute or imply endorsement of these organizations or
their programs by CDC or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. CDC is not responsible for the content of these sites. URL addresses listed in
MMWR were current as of the date of publication.
✩U.S. Government Printing Office: 2006-523-056/40006 Region IV ISSN: 1057-5987
